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THE FUTURE OF COLLEGE SPORTS AFTER ALSTON:
REFORMING THE NCAA VIA CONDITIONAL
ANTITRUST IMMUNITY

NATHANIEL GROW*
ABSTRACT
In June 2021, a unanimous U.S. Supreme Court issued its eagerly
anticipated decision in National Collegiate Athletic Association v.
Alston, ruling for the first time that NCAA rules governing studentathlete eligibility are subject to full scrutiny under federal antitrust
law. Although the immediate impact of the Alston decision was
rather modest—merely requiring the NCAA to allow its schools to
compete by offering prospective players education-related benefits
such as laptop computers and stipends for future graduate-level
study—the Court hinted that it was prepared to extend the logic of
this ruling much further, calling into question the legality of the
NCAA’s entire model of “amateur” intercollegiate athletics. As a
result, many suspect that it is only a matter of time before the
judiciary requires the NCAA to introduce some form of “pay-for-play”
to college sports.
This setback for the NCAA coincided with another monumental
change to the college sports landscape in the summer of 2021. Within
days of its decisive loss at the Supreme Court, the NCAA—for the
first time—decided to allow student-athletes to retain their collegiate
eligibility despite having monetized their so-called “name, image,
and likeness” (NIL) rights by signing endorsement contracts with
third-party companies. The association did not do so willingly,
however, but only after its hand was forced by the twenty-seven
different states that had enacted legislation prohibiting universities
* Associate Professor of Business Law & Ethics and Yormark Family Director of the
Sports Industry Workshop, Kelley School of Business, Indiana University.
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within their jurisdiction from denying their college athletes this
right.
In response to these events—and the Supreme Court’s admonishment in particular—the NCAA and its membership began to rethink
the association’s supervisory role over intercollegiate athletics. Most
notably, the NCAA recently ratified a significant overhaul of its
organizational constitution in January 2022. This has set the stage
for a meaningful decentralization of the industry, with increased
decision-making authority likely to be delegated back to individual
universities and conferences.
Although such a response to the events of 2021 is more than
understandable given the association’s potential legal liability postAlston, the NCAA’s restructuring nevertheless threatens to exacerbate
several undesirable trends in intercollegiate athletics. Indeed, the uncommon industrial organization of U.S. intercollegiate athletics has
created atypical economic incentives that have already resulted in
remarkably elevated levels of deficit spending, a high degree of competitive imbalance on the playing field, and insufficient protection of
student-athletes’ education and medical well-being. Unfortunately,
because the college sports industry faces an unusual legal impediment that will hinder its ability to successfully adjust to increased
commercialization and competition between schools—namely, an
inability to collectively bargain with its players on an industry-wide
basis—the coming decentralization is likely to only further exacerbate these problems.
Therefore, this Article asserts that Congress should intervene to
help chart the course for the future of U.S. intercollegiate athletics.
Specifically, this Article makes the case for granting the NCAA and
its member institutions a limited and conditional antitrust exemption, proposing two alternative models that would give the industry
the power to regulate itself while simultaneously imposing meaningful reforms on the NCAA to ensure that its governance model better
advances the interests of its players in the future.
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INTRODUCTION
Even by its own tumultuous standards, the National Collegiate
Athletic Association (NCAA)1 currently finds itself at a particularly
uncertain juncture.2 For years, the association’s “amateur” model of
intercollegiate athletics has been under attack, with critics highlighting the system’s perceived exploitation of its student-athletes.
Indeed, despite helping to generate nearly $19 billion per year in
revenue,3 the NCAA’s code of amateurism has historically forbidden
1. The NCAA is an unincorporated association of over 1,100 athletics-sponsoring colleges
and universities that have vested the association with the power to regulate nearly every
aspect of intercollegiate athletic competition. See, e.g., Nathan Hunt, Note, Cureton v. NCAA:
Fumble! The Flawed Use of Proposition 16 by the NCAA, 31 U. TOL. L. REV. 273, 277-78 (2000)
(“The NCAA is the governing body of American intercollegiate sports. It is a voluntary,
unincorporated organization, with a current membership of [approximately] 1,200 U.S.
colleges, universities, conferences, and other bodies of higher education. The NCAA divides
its membership into three separate classes: Division I, Division II, and Division III.”
(footnotes omitted) (first citing Cureton v. NCAA, 37 F. Supp. 2d 687, 690 (E.D. Pa. 1999); and
then citing Kenneth L. Shropshire, Colorblind Propositions: Race, the SAT, & the NCAA, 8
STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 141, 151 tbl.1 (1997))). In particular, the NCAA’s member institutions
have charged the association with the mission of “govern[ing] competition in a fair, safe,
equitable and sportsmanlike manner, and ... integrat[ing] intercollegiate athletics into higher
education so that the educational experience of the student-athlete is paramount.” NCAA
Mission Statement, CITADEL (Mar. 6, 2007), http://www.citadel.edu/root/ncaa_mission
[https://perma.cc/223U-BLZ5]. Although membership in the NCAA is strictly voluntary as a
legal matter, in reality, any four-year college or university that wishes to participate in major,
intercollegiate athletic competition has no choice but to join the association as no feasible
alternatives exist to provide a source of competition. See Note, Sherman Act Invalidation of
the NCAA Amateurism Rules, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1299, 1305 n.35 (1992) (contending that
“college and university membership in the NCAA may not truly be voluntary” because “[i]f a
university wishes to benefit from the national media exposure and revenues that participation
in intercollegiate athletics provides, it must join the NCAA” (citing Gulf S. Conf. v. Boyd, 369
So. 2d 553, 557 (Ala. 1979))).
2. A number of commentators have contended that the NCAA has been mired in a crisis
for better part of the last decade. See, e.g., Thomas J. Horton, Drew DeGroot & Tyler Custis,
Addressing the Current Crisis in NCAA Intercollegiate Athletics: Where Is Congress?, 26 MARQ.
SPORTS L. REV. 363, 363 (2016) (“American intercollegiate athletics are in a state of crisis
today.” (citing commentators asserting same)); Todd A. McFall, Hey, College Sports.
Compromise on Compensation and You Can Have a Legal Monopoly, 26 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV.
459, 462 (2016) (contending that the NCAA is facing an “existential crisis”); Stephen F. Ross,
Radical Reform of Intercollegiate Athletics: Antitrust and Public Policy Implications, 86 TUL.
L. REV. 933, 934 (2012) (“Universities operating major intercollegiate athletic programs are
heading for, if not already in, a crisis.”).
3. See NCAA RESEARCH, 15-YEAR TRENDS IN DIVISION I ATHLETICS FINANCES,
https://ncaaorg.s3.amazonaws.com/research/Finances/2020RES_D1-RevExp_Report.pdf
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players from receiving any non-education-related compensation.4
Thus, while college coaches and administrators often rake in salaries in the hundreds of thousands or millions of dollars, the
players—disproportionately students of color from disadvantaged
backgrounds—are, in the eyes of many, insufficiently compensated
for their efforts.5
The NCAA’s detractors have, in turn, attacked the association on
numerous fronts in recent years in the hopes of forcing the industry
to reform. Two of these efforts converged in the summer of 2021,
presenting an unprecedented challenge to the traditional business
model of intercollegiate athletics.
First, the U.S. Supreme Court released its highly anticipated
decision in the case of National Collegiate Athletic Association v.
Alston, an antitrust lawsuit challenging NCAA restrictions on
student-athlete compensation under the Sherman Act.6 In Alston,
a unanimous Supreme Court ruled that the NCAA could not legally
prevent its member colleges and universities from competing by
offering current and prospective student-athletes various educationrelated benefits (such as laptop computers, study abroad trips, or

[https://perma.cc/SH4K-FVN6] (reporting that total athletics revenue reported among all
NCAA athletics departments in 2019 was $18.9 billion); see also Gabe Feldman, A Modest
Proposal for Taming the Antitrust Beast, 41 PEPP. L. REV. 249, 250 (2014) (“Commentators
have long derided the stubborn ‘myth of amateurism,’ noting that the NCAA has morphed into
a profit-seeking machine that serves the decidedly professional and economic function of
regulating college sports. That criticism has only amplified over the last decade with the birth
of billion dollar television deals, expanding tournament fields, and, of course, conference
realignment.” (footnotes omitted) (quoting Amy Christian McCormick & Robert A.
McCormick, The Emperor’s New Clothes: Lifting the NCAA’s Veil of Amateurism, 45 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 495, 496 (2008)) (citing Taylor Branch, The Shame of College Sports, ATL.
MONTHLY,Oct. 2011, at 80, https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2011/10/the-shameof-college-sports/308643/)).
4. See Tibor Nagy, The “Blind Look” Rule of Reason: Federal Courts’ Peculiar Treatment
of NCAA Amateurism Rules, 15 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 331, 343 (2005) (describing “the
NCAA’s most basic amateurism rule” as being “the prohibition on athletes’ receiving monetary
compensation for playing sports” (citing Jones v. NCAA, 392 F. Supp. 295, 295 (D. Mass.
1975))).
5. In fact, at least one study has found that upwards of 80 percent of full-scholarship
student-athletes live at or below the poverty level. See William B. Gould IV, American
Amateur Players Arise: You Have Nothing to Lose but Your Amateurism, 61 SANTA CLARA L.
REV. 159, 160 (2020) (quoting comments by California state senators Nancy Skinner and
Steven Bradford, asserting the same).
6. 141 S. Ct. 2141, 2147 (2021).
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stipends for future graduate-level study).7 Although the immediate
implications of the Court’s opinion were relatively modest, when
reading between the lines, the decision suggests that the Justices
were prepared to issue a much broader rebuke of the NCAA’s
amateurism model had the posture of the case permitted them to do
so.8 In fact, in a scathing concurring opinion, Justice Kavanaugh
went so far as to state that the “NCAA’s business model [of relying
on unpaid, amateur athletes] would be flatly illegal in almost any
other industry in America.”9 As a result, many believe it is only a
matter of time before the judiciary forces the NCAA to allow its
schools to pay their athletes above and beyond the cost of their
college attendance, effectively introducing a system of “pay-for-play”
to college sports.10
Meanwhile, at the same time the Supreme Court was preparing
its decision in Alston, the NCAA was attempting to fend off a series
of state-level statutes enacted to provide college student-athletes
with an express right to profit off of their name, image, and likeness
(NIL). Following the lead of California, whose enactment of the Fair
Pay to Play Act in 2019 initiated this wave of legislation,11 by the
summer of 2021, a total of twenty-seven states had passed laws
forbidding any institution of higher education within their borders
from punishing its student-athletes for signing endorsement
contracts with third-party businesses.12 Thus, student-athletes in
these twenty-seven states were poised—for the first time in NCAA
7. Id. at 2164.
8. See infra notes 93-99 and accompanying text.
9. Alston, 141 S. Ct. at 2167 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).
10. See, e.g., Ian Millhiser, The Supreme Court’s Unanimous Decision on Paying NCAA
Student-Athletes, Explained, VOX (June 21, 2021, 12:56 PM), https://www.vox.com/2021/6/21/
22543598/supreme-court-ncaa-alston-student-athletes-football-basketball-sports-antitrust
[https://perma.cc/UA7P-A7CD] (“The NCAA may suffer an even more significant loss in a
future case.”).
11. See Sarah Traynor, Note, California Says Checkmate: Exploring the Nation’s First Fair
Pay to Play Act and What It Means for the Future of the NCAA and Female Student-Athletes,
20 WAKE FOREST J. BUS. & INTELL. PROP. L. 203, 216 (2020) (“California’s passage of the Fair
Pay to Play Act has resulted in an unprecedented wave of state legislation seeking to control
the NCAA.”).
12. See Dan Murphy, Everything You Need to Know About the NCAA’s NIL Debate, ESPN
(Sept. 1, 2021), https://www.espn.com/college-sports/story/_/id/31086019/everything-needknow-ncaa-nil-debate [https://perma.cc/6P77-P2M6] (identifying the various laws and their
respective effective dates).
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history—to be allowed to retain their college eligibility despite being
compensated for their athletic abilities above and beyond the cost of
their scholarships. Because many of these laws were scheduled to
go into effect on July 1, 2021, the NCAA faced a looming deadline to
enact meaningful reform of its compensation restrictions.13 After
failing to secure a nationwide legislative reprieve from Congress,
the NCAA ultimately relented, announcing that it would allow
student-athletes to receive endorsement income without restriction
effective July 1.14
Acknowledging its tenuous legal position post-Alston—and responding to the agitation for a meaningful restructuring of the
industry by countless leaders throughout college sports—the NCAA
responded to these collective developments by announcing in the fall
of 2021 that it would be undertaking a historic revision of its
organizational constitution, along with a corresponding reevaluation
of its supervisory role over intercollegiate athletics.15 The end result
of these efforts is widely anticipated to be a significant deregulation
of the industry, with the NCAA ceding large swaths of its authority
back to individual universities and conferences to govern themselves.16 It is believed that such a restructuring would free the
schools and conferences to more efficiently implement market-based
reforms to the present system while simultaneously decreasing the
industry’s potential antitrust liability (by avoiding the formulation
of industry-wide, mandatory rules applicable to the entire NCAA
membership).17
Unfortunately, although the NCAA’s response to the events of
2021 is quite understandable from a legal perspective, granting the
13. See id. (reporting the effective dates of each state’s legislation).
14. See Alan Blinder, College Athletes May Earn Money from Their Fame, N.C.A.A. Rules,
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 29, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/30/sports/ncaabasketball/ncaanil-rules.html [https://perma.cc/G6Z2-KYZM].
15. Charlie Henry, Constitution Committee Introduces Draft Constitution, NCAA (Nov.
8, 2021, 10:02 AM), https://www.ncaa.org/news/2021/11/8/general-constitution-committeeintroduces-draft-constitution.aspx [https://perma.cc/YG5R-4EGL].
16. See, e.g., ASSOCIATED PRESS, NCAA Releases Draft of Streamlined Constitution That
Would Give Power to Schools, ESPN (Nov. 8, 2021), https://www.espn.com/college-sports/
story/_/id/32583346/ncaa-releases-draft-streamlined-constitution-give-power-schools [https://
perma.cc/573J-V374].
17. See generally Peter Kreher, Antitrust Theory, College Sports, and Interleague
Rulemaking: A New Critique of the NCAA’s Amateurism Rules, 6 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 51
(2006).
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most powerful athletic conferences even further autonomy to create
their own rules is likely to exacerbate several troubling trends in
the industry. Specifically, intercollegiate athletics is already subject
to an “arms race” mentality, in which vigorous competition between
athletic programs for any leg up on the playing field leads to
spending patterns in which all but a handful of universities consistently lose money on their sports programs—losses that often reach
into the tens of millions of dollars.18 This phenomenon results from
the industry’s atypical—but heretofore largely overlooked— industrial organization and its corresponding economic incentives, in
which highly competitive, nonprofit entities, unbeholden to shareholder interests, are motivated to spend every possible dollar
advancing their competitive mission.19 Not only have these incentives often resulted in extreme levels of competitive imbalance on
the playing field but these overriding competitive concerns have also
frequently led NCAA schools to shortchange the educational and
medical well-being of their student-athletes in the pursuit of greater
success on the playing field.20
Thus, left to their own devices, individual universities and
athletic conferences will likely free their schools to compete with one
another in far greater ways (both financially and otherwise), further
exacerbating these concerns. Indeed, given the industry’s unusual
legal constraints—and its inability to collectively bargain with its
players on an industry-wide basis, in particular21—it is doubtful
that NCAA schools will be able to take the steps necessary to ensure
that the coming decentralization does not result in additional deficit
spending, greater deprioritization of student-athletes’ educational
and medical needs, or a further erosion of the industry’s already
questionable level of competitive balance.22
Consequently, this Article asserts that the time has come for
Congress to intervene to help chart a sustainable course for the
future of intercollegiate athletics. Specifically, it argues that the
18. See infra Part I.
19. See infra Part I.
20. See infra notes 62-66 and accompanying text (summarizing recent NCAA scandals
involving schools cutting corners with respect to their athletes’ best educational and medical
interests).
21. See infra Part III.A.
22. See infra Part III.B.
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NCAA should be granted a limited and conditional antitrust
exemption, laying out two potential paths for Congress to follow
depending on its preferred policy outcome. Option one would
effectively preserve the new status quo by providing the NCAA with
an antitrust exemption allowing the association to continue to
prohibit schools from directly providing cash compensation to
student-athletes while nevertheless maintaining the rights of
athletes to freely monetize their NIL. Thus, in effect, this first
option would implement something akin to the so-called “Olympic”
governance model. Meanwhile, the second option would allow NCAA
schools to provide cash compensation to their student-athletes,
while nevertheless granting the NCAA an antitrust exemption,
permitting it to impose reasonable spending limits on this monetary
competition (and other related spending). Thus, option two would
help to remedy the perceived injustice of the current system while
still providing the necessary safeguards to ensure that the resulting
competition does not become financially or competitively ruinous.
At the same time, however, this Article cautions that giving the
NCAA—at least in its current form—unchecked free reign to preside
over the college sports industry on a going-forward basis would be
inadvisable, as history has shown that the association’s membership
is often either unable or unwilling to meaningfully reform itself in
order to advance the interests of its student-athletes. As a result,
regardless which path Congress chooses, any resulting antitrust immunity should—at a minimum—be conditioned on the NCAA taking
concrete steps to better protect and advance the rights of studentathletes.
This Article proceeds in four Parts. Part I explores the oftenoverlooked, unusual structural economic incentives at play in U.S.
intercollegiate athletics and documents the various suboptimal
effects that have resulted. Part II then provides a brief overview of
the Alston litigation, explaining why the Supreme Court’s decision
in the case is widely expected to invite further antitrust challenges
to the NCAA’s amateurism model. Next, Part III considers the legal
impediments that will likely prevent the college sports industry
from effectively regulating itself post-Alston, as well as the deleterious policy ramifications that can be expected to result. Finally,
Part IV sets forth the case for a conditional antitrust exemption for
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the NCAA, proposing two alternative paths that Congress could
follow to reform U.S. intercollegiate athletics, as well as several key
conditions that should be imposed on the NCAA in exchange for this
protection.
I. COLLEGE ATHLETICS AND THE NONPROFIT PARADOX23
There is little doubt that the optics of the current economic
structure of U.S. intercollegiate athletics are—especially at first
glance—not particularly flattering. The NCAA and its member
schools collectively generate billions of dollars of revenue per year.
In turn, these universities reward their administrators and coaches
richly, with salaries routinely reaching into the millions of dollars.24
At the same time, however, according to one study, upwards of 80
percent of student-athletes attending school on full scholarships find
themselves living below the poverty line.25 As a result, few would
seriously dispute that the values of college sports are—one way or
the other—currently out of whack or that the industry is in dire
need of reform.26
Indeed, countless commentators have observed that the college
sports industry is engaged in a classic “arms race,” with institutions
continuously competing to outspend one another.27 Unable to
23. This subtitle is borrowed in part from Kevin Blue, Rising Expenses in College Athletics
and the Non-Profit Paradox, ATHLETICDIRECTORU, https://www.athleticdirectoru.com/articles/
kevin-blue-rising-expenses-in-college-athletics-and-the-non-profit-paradox/ [https://perma.cc/
A2M6-W2XG].
24. See supra notes 3-5 and accompanying text.
25. See Gould, supra note 5, at 160 (quoting comments by California state senators Nancy
Skinner and Steven Bradford, asserting the same).
26. See Josephine (Jo) R. Potuto, The Once and Future NCAA and Collegiate Sports, 6
ARIZ. ST. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 85, 90 (2016) (“Most everyone agrees that collegiate sports ... are
out of whack with the values that should underlie athletics on our campuses. Finding a way
to re-achieve a balance ... so far has proved elusive.” (footnote omitted) (first citing Jake New,
Left Behind, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Aug. 5, 2014), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/
2014/08/05/growing-stratification-ncaa-conferences-concerns-less-wealthy-division-i-colleges;
and then citing Jon Solomon, Power Five Passes on Tackling Big NCAA Issues to Help
Athletes, CBS SPORTS (Jan. 15, 2016, 2:15 PM), https://www.cbssports.com/college-football/
news/power-five-passes-on-tackling-big-ncaa-issues-to-help-athletes/)).
27. See, e.g., Lora Wuerdeman, Sidelining Big Business in Intercollegiate Athletics, How
the NCAA Can De-Escalate the Arms Race by Implementing a Budgetary Allocation for
Athletic Departments, 39 N.C. CENT. L. REV. 85, 88-89 (2017) (characterizing the college sports
industry as being engaged in an “arms race” in which “universities are outspending one
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compete for the services of their student-athletes through differences in monetary compensation, schools must instead attempt to
differentiate themselves by using noneconomic factors such as the
caliber of their coaching staffs and the quality of their athletic
facilities.28 Consequently, while recent years have seen an explosion
in the revenues college athletics departments generated, the industry has also witnessed a commensurate rise in expenses.29 Today,
the highest-paid state employee in most states will inevitably be a
college football or basketball coach,30 with the most extreme
example currently being the University of Alabama’s Nick Saban,
who makes over $9 million per year to coach the school’s football
team.31 At the same time, universities are also spending ever greater sums upgrading their stadiums, arenas, and practice facilities in
the hopes of wooing the best talent to their athletic programs.32
Thus, although many casual observers believe that college athletic departments generate considerable excess revenues for their
institutions, in most cases this could not be further from the truth.33
Only around twenty to twenty-five athletic departments generate a
net profit in any given year while the overwhelming majority spend

another in an effort to remain competitive in recruitment”).
28. See Allen R. Sanderson & John J. Siegfried, The National Collegiate Athletic
Association Cartel: Why It Exists, How It Works, and What It Does, 52 REV. INDUS. ORG. 185,
199 (2018) (“When direct price (salary) competition is prohibited, non-price competition will
increasingly affect prospective players’ choices about which institution to attend.”).
29. See Blue, supra note 23 (explaining that the college sports industry exhibits the typical
trend that “when revenues increase for a non-profit organization, expenses tend to grow
commensurately”).
30. See Reuben Fischer-Baum, Infographic: Is Your State’s Highest-Paid Employee a
Coach? (Probably), DEADSPIN (May 9, 2013, 3:23 PM), http://deadspin.com/infographic-is-yourstates-highest-paid-employee-a-co-489635228 [https://perma.cc/26DM-P2VX].
31. Edward Sutelan, Nick Saban’s Salary & Net Worth: Here’s How Much Money the
Alabama Coach Made in 2021, SPORTING NEWS (Dec. 31, 2021), https://www.sportingnews.
com/us/ncaa-football/news/nick-saban-salary-net-worth-alabama-coach-2021/7v1yrapfp5lozin
062r07cav [https://perma.cc/6V7S-5XGH].
32. See David A. Grenardo, The Continued Exploitation of the College Athlete: Confessions
of a Former College Athlete Turned Law Professor, 95 OR. L. REV. 223, 240-41 (2016) (“Athletic
departments also spend millions on facilities to attract the top college athletes.” (citing
Telephone Interview with Jay Bilas, J.D., ESPN Analyst, Of Counsel, Moore & Van Allen
(July 24, 2015))).
33. See Sanderson & Siegfried, supra note 28, at 190 (“Most Americans believe that
intercollegiate athletics raises money for their host institutions.” (citing a 2006 Knight
Commission survey)).
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more money than they earn in revenue (often considerably so).34 As
of the 2017-18 school year, for example, the median deficit at a
major Division I Football Bowl Subdivision (FBS) athletic department was $16.3 million.35 Even if one were to only focus on the five
richest college conferences that generate the bulk of the college
sports industry’s revenue—the so-called “Power Five”36—the median
operating deficit still stood at $2.6 million.37 And even that number
obscures the substantial wealth disparities within the elite tier of
intercollegiate athletics, as the bottom half of the Power Five
schools faced a median operating deficit of $10.6 million.38 Indeed,

34. See Matthew Mitten & Stephen F. Ross, A Regulatory Solution to Better Promote the
Educational Values and Economic Sustainability of Intercollegiate Athletics, 92 OR. L. REV.
837, 846 (2014) (“[U]nder certain accounting conventions relatively few Division I athletic
departments (no more than approximately twenty to twenty-five each year) have revenues
that equal or exceed their respective costs of producing intercollegiate athletics.” (citing
DANIEL L. FULKS, NCAA, REVENUES & EXPENSES: 2004-2012 NCAA DIVISION I INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS PROGRAMS REPORT 8, 13 (2013), https://www.ncaapublications.com/p4306-revenues-and-expenses-2004-2012-ncaa-division-i-intercollegiate-athletics-programsreport.aspx)).
35. Andrew Zimbalist, Rescuing College Sports from Its Economic and Moral Abyss,
FORBES (Aug. 10, 2020, 10:27 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/andrewzimbalist/2020/08/10/
rescuing-college-sports-from-its-economic-and-moral-abyss/#:~:text=NIL%20reform
%20promises%20to%20allow,contracts%20with%20university%20athletics%20departments
[https://perma.cc/C6LC-67V3].
The NCAA member institutions are currently divided into three divisions, with those in
Division I competing at the highest (and most expensive) level. Meanwhile, Division I itself
has subsequently been divided into different tiers, with the schools participating at the FBS
level constituting those who compete at the highest level of Division I athletics. See Nathan
Boninger, Comment, Antitrust and the NCAA: Sexual Equality in Collegiate Athletics as a
Procompetitive Justification for NCAA Compensation Restrictions, 65 UCLA L. REV. 754, 777
n.171 (2018) (“‘Among the three NCAA divisions, Division I schools generally have the biggest
student bodies, manage the largest athletics budgets and offer the most generous number of
scholarships.’ ... Division I is also further divided solely with respect to football, with the
highest level being the Football Bowl Subdivision (FBS), which is comprised of schools that
participate in bowl games.” (quoting NCAA Division I, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/about?divi
sion=d1 [https://perma.cc/97SK-6YTQ])).
36. Specifically, the Power Five conferences currently consist of the Atlantic Coast
Conference (ACC), Big Ten Conference, Big 12 Conference, Pacific 12 Conference (Pac-12), and
the Southeastern Conference (SEC). See Nicholas C. Daly, Note, Amateur Hour Is Over: Time
for College Athletes to Clock In Under the FLSA, 37 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 471, 487 (2021)
(identifying the Power Five athletic conferences).
37. See Zimbalist, supra note 35.
38. Id.
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as but one example, in 2014 alone, the Rutgers athletic department
ran a $28 million operating budget deficit.39
In order to cover these cost overruns, NCAA schools frequently
divert resources from their general coffers to subsidize their sports
programs. In 2013, for instance, U.S. colleges and universities
collectively transferred over $1 billion per year in general student
fees and tuition to their athletic departments.40 Meanwhile, a different study has shown that 90 percent of NCAA Division I athletic
programs rely on economic subsidies from their universities to cover
their costs.41 As a result, a school’s intercollegiate athletics program
today often consumes upwards of 5 percent of its overall institutional budget.42
Pinning the blame for such extreme levels of spending on a failure
of institutional leadership is easy—and, at some level, undoubtedly
correct.43 Meanwhile, other critics may contend that the accounting
methodologies above fail to factor in all of the benefits that flow
from a college sports program to its larger university (such as the
free marketing that a winning team can generate among prospective
student applicants).44 Even acknowledging this latter point, however,
39. See Cody J. McDavis, Comment, The Value of Amateurism, 29 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV.
275, 280 (2018) (citing Steve Berkowitz, Jodi Upton & Erik Brady, Most NCAA Division I
Athletic Departments Take Subsidies, USA TODAY (July 1, 2013, 12:48 PM), https://www.usa
today.com/story/sports/college/2013/05/07/ncaa-finances-subsidies/2142443/).
40. See Sanderson & Siegfried, supra note 28, at 190 (citing the same USA Today report
cited supra note 39 showing the same).
41. See McDavis, supra note 39, at 280.
42. See Matthew J. Mitten, James L. Musselman & Bruce W. Burton, Targeted Reform
of Commercialized Intercollegiate Athletics, 47 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 779, 803 (2010) (“Total
athletic department spending was approximately 5% of total university expenses at median
FBS institutions.” (citing DANIEL L. FULKS, NCAA, REVENUES & EXPENSES: 2004-06 NCAA
REVENUES AND EXPENSES OF DIVISION I INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS PROGRAMS REPORT 7
(2008), https://www.ncaapublications.com/productdownloads/RE2008.pdf)).
43. But see Blue, supra note 23 (asserting that, perhaps counterintuitively, the college
sports arms race is “not the result of ‘flawed institutional leadership’”).
44. See Linda Emma, The Importance of College Athletic Programs to Universities,
SEATTLE PI, https://education.seattlepi.com/importance-college-athletic-programs-universities1749.html [https://perma.cc/R877-JYB4] (“College athletics programs represent a multibillion
dollar industry and are integrally linked to school branding and reputation. And while
individual sports programs—even in Division I schools—don’t necessarily turn a profit, the
many other benefits to colleges have far-reaching implications for students, faculty and
community.”); see also Mitten & Ross, supra note 34, at 845 (“The use of intercollegiate sports
by university leaders as part of their efforts to enable their respective institutions to flourish
in an increasingly competitive higher education environment is a rational response to
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one cannot fully understand the current economic structure of U.S.
intercollegiate athletics without considering its unique—but often
overlooked—industrial organization, the implications of which help
explain the seemingly unjustifiable spending patterns highlighted
above.
Specifically, college athletic departments are typically structured
as nonprofit organizations.45 Unlike for-profit businesses, which exist to maximize the income of their owners or shareholders,
nonprofits “do not operate with the goal of making a profit.”46
Instead, the purpose of a nonprofit is ultimately to maximize the
impact of its mission, with any new income generated by the organization put to use to further its objective.47 Importantly, however,
college sports programs occupy an unusual space amongst the
greater universe of nonprofit organizations. Whereas most nonprofits exist to advance the greater good by conferring benefits to the
public,48 college athletic departments exist primarily to facilitate
zero-sum competition amongst one another. “[I]n other words, a
college sports program can only succeed at the competitive part of
its mission (win) if another fails (lose).”49 Unlike professional sports
organizations—whose ownership balances on-field competitive
considerations with the need to manage overall profits and longterm franchise value—administrators in the intercollegiate athletics
industry are incentivized to spend “[e]very dollar of generated

marketplace realities.”).
45. Cf. Ted Tatos, An Empirical Evaluation of EADA and NCAA College Sports Financial
Data: Applications for Research and Litigation, 29 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 411, 411 (2019)
(noting discussion of the “ostensibly nonprofit” nature of “college athletic departments”).
46. Blue, supra note 23; see also Jayma Meyer & Andrew Zimbalist, Reforming College
Sports: The Case for a Limited and Conditional Antitrust Exemption, 62 ANTITRUST BULL. 31,
33 (2017) (“Unlike a typical commercial enterprise, college sports programs do not have
stockholders who demand a profit at the end of each quarter so that the price of the company’s
stock will rise or that dividends may be paid out.”).
47. Blue, supra note 23 (explaining that “when revenues increase for a non-profit
organization,” any additional “income is used by the organization to further pursue its
mission, not to create profitable operating margins”).
48. See Michael J. DeBoer, Religious Hospitals and the Federal Community Benefit
Standard—Counting Religious Purpose as a Tax-Exemption Factor for Hospitals, 42 SETON
HALL L. REV. 1549, 1609 (2012) (“People and groups form nonprofit organizations to confer
public or mutual benefits or to advance religious purposes.” (citing Hosanna-Tabor
Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 189 (2012))).
49. Blue, supra note 23.
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revenue ... in pursuit of the competitive and student-athlete
education missions.”50
Therefore, from a behavioral economics perspective, the current
deficit spending patterns of the college sports industry are actually
perfectly rational.51 Indeed, as Professor Matthew Mitten has noted,
“[t]he significant economic rewards of winning [on the playing field]
have generated fierce off-field competition among universities.”52
College administrators often face substantial pressure to win from
their various stakeholders: alumni, boosters, current students,
and—at least in the case of state universities—occasionally even
politicians.53 So great is this pressure, in fact, that surveys have
shown that upwards of 80 percent of college presidents at institutions with major sports programs believe that “they are unable to
control the excesses of ... commercialized” intercollegiate athletics.54
As a result, athletic departments are strongly incentivized to seek
out any possible competitive advantage they can secure over their
rivals.55 And because relatively small differences in spending can
yield significant advantages on the playing field,56 even the less
financially successful athletic programs can feel considerable
pressure to keep up with the spending habits of the handful of
schools that actually turn a profit on their sports programs, lest
they fall even further behind the competition (which, in turn, would
fuel a vicious cycle resulting in even greater financial disparities).57
50. Id.
51. See id.
52. Matthew J. Mitten, Applying Antitrust Law to NCAA Regulation of “Big Time” College
Athletics: The Need to Shift from Nostalgic 19th and 20th Century Ideals of Amateurism to the
Economic Realities of the 21st Century, 11 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 1, 2 (2000).
53. See Zimbalist, supra note 35 (observing that university athletic “programs ... have
stakeholders (boosters, alumni, state legislators, students) pressuring for victories”).
54. Donna A. Lopiano, Fixing Enforcement and Due Process Will Not Fix What Is Wrong
with the NCAA, 20 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 250, 270 (2015) (citing research from the
Knight Commission on Intercollegiate Athletics).
55. See infra note 57 and accompanying text.
56. See Sanderson & Siegfried, supra note 28, at 191 (“Small differences in spending can
yield large advantages in recruiting and subsequently in winning. Unsuccessful programs
have little choice but to ratchet up spending, or they may fall even farther behind in the
competition for players and coaches, with devastating effects on their revenues.”).
57. See Blue, supra note 23 (“[E]ven though Power Five schools have more revenue to
deploy than others on an absolute basis, a majority of them remain under financial pressure
trying to keep up with the small group of schools who set a high bar on expenses in search of
every possible competitive advantage.”); see also Sanderson & Siegfried, supra note 28, at 191
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Consequently, the persistent deficit spending by intercollegiate athletics programs is not simply evidence of some widespread failure in
leadership but instead represents a fundamental flaw innate to the
industry’s structural organization.58
Unfortunately, the same structural incentives that have driven
many athletic departments to seemingly unsustainable levels of
deficit spending in the pursuit of success on the playing field can
also lead to other pernicious effects. Specifically, the tremendous
competitive pressure that universities often face to “win-at-all costs”
has arguably led a number of prominent programs to cut corners in
various ways in recent years, resulting in a degradation of both
their student-athletes’ educational experience as well as their physical health and safety.59
With respect to education, the perception has long existed that
rather than strive to provide their athletes with the best educational
experience possible, many high-profile athletic programs instead
funnel players into easier classes in order to ensure that they remain academically eligible to compete on the playing field. Perhaps
the most noteworthy example of such a phenomenon comes from the
University of North Carolina, which maintained a series of so-called
“paper classes” for years, in which student-athletes “took sham
courses and participated in fake independent study projects ...
earning academic credit and high grades for little or no work.”60
Similarly, critics of the NCAA often allege that its member
schools have been allowed to deemphasize the health and safety of
their student-athletes in various ways in the pursuit of competitive
success on the playing field.61 These allegations range from a failure
(“Thus, the net positive revenues of a few dozen teams steadily drive up costs for all
competitive teams.”).
58. See Blue, supra note 23 (“Expense increases thus reflect systemic characteristics, and
not ‘flaws’ of involved individuals. College athletics decision-makers are acting rationally and
predictably in the current system, just like others would if confronted with similar industry
characteristics.”).
59. See Lee Goldman, Sports and Antitrust: Should College Students Be Paid to Play?, 65
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 206, 257 (1990) (“The money generated from college athletics has
reached such levels that it is almost inevitable that all persons involved in big-time college
athletics develop a ‘win-at-all costs’ mentality that compromises educational interests.”).
60. Carl T. Bogus, Introduction to Symposium: Should There Be Some Form of Judicial
or Other Independent Review of NCAA Enforcement Actions?, 20 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV.
209, 211 (2015).
61. See, e.g., John T. Holden, Marc Edelman, Thomas A. Baker III & Andrew G. Shuman,
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to protect players from the dangers of head injuries,62 to risky
practice methods,63 abusive coaching practices,64 and even the
“systemic failure to protect [student-athletes] from sexual abuse” in
the case of Michigan State University and its former employee,
Larry Nassar.65 Although a variety of factors have undoubtedly
contributed to these unfortunate incidents, it seems clear that the
tremendous pressure placed on coaches and college athletics administrators to win will inevitably result in some programs—if left
largely to their own devices—deprioritizing the educational and
medical well-being of their athletes in pursuit of competitive
success.66
Thus, the U.S. intercollegiate athletics’ irregular structural organization and resulting incentives have had a variety of suboptimal
ramifications for the industry. These dynamics will be further
explored in greater detail below, but for now merely noting that the
nature of the college sports’ “nonprofit paradox” would suggest that
any new economic competition between schools is only likely to further the industry’s already persistent levels of deficit spending,
whereas any substantial divestment of authority by the NCAA is

Reimagining the Governance of College Sports After Alston, 74 FLA. L. REV. 427, 446-51 (2022)
(outlining concerns).
62. See Rodney K. Smith, Head Injuries, Student Welfare, and Saving College Football:
A Game Plan for the NCAA, 41 PEPP. L. REV. 267, 302 (2014) (attributing the NCAA’s
concussion-related injury issues with the “‘win at all costs’ and ‘play through injury’ mentality” that exists in many programs (quoting Rodney K. Smith, Opinion, Picking Politics and
Football Over Education, USA TODAY (Jan. 3, 2013, 3:00 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/
story/opinion/2013/01/03/penn-state-ncaa-sanctions-sandusky-tom-corbett/1805189/)).
63. See Holden et al., supra note 61, at 446-47 (recounting the circumstances surrounding
the death of former University of Maryland football player Jordan McNair “who died as a
result of heat stroke during a football practice” (citing Rae-Anna Sollestre, Comment,
Wrongful Death: Does the NCAA Have an Affirmative Duty to Protect Its Student-Athletes?,
30 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 393, 394-96 (2020))).
64. See id. at 447 (“[F]ormer Rutgers University basketball coach, Mike Rice, ... was
caught on video hitting his players.” (citing Tom Canavan, Rutgers Fires Basketball Coach
Over Abuse, Taunts, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Apr. 3, 2013, https://apnews.com/article/aee9e01877
184066b1007074c984cd45)).
65. Susan Svrluga & Moriah Balingit, DeVos Imposes Record $4.5 Million Fine on
Michigan State for Systemic Failure to Address Sexual Abuse, WASH. POST (Sept. 5, 2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/education/2019/09/05/devos-imposes-record-million-finemichigan-state-systemic-failure-address-sexual-abuse-larry-nassar-case/ [https://perma.cc/W7
QV-PMGL].
66. See Smith, supra note 62, at 302.
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unlikely to alleviate—and may very well exacerbate—the existing
educational and health-related concerns outlined above is sufficient.
II. THE NCAA’S DAY OF RECKONING AT THE SUPREME COURT
The perception that the NCAA’s existing amateurism model exploits student-athletes has generated several high-profile lawsuits
over the past decade. Somewhat surprisingly, however, prior to the
most recent spate of litigation, the judiciary was frequently willing
to shield the NCAA’s student-athlete compensation and eligibility
restrictions from scrutiny under federal antitrust law. Dating back
to the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1984 decision in NCAA v. Board of
Regents of the University of Oklahoma, jurists had generally adopted
a bifurcated approach when considering antitrust lawsuits against
the NCAA.67 Specifically, while courts were willing to strike down
NCAA restraints that directly affected commercial interests such as
television contracts or coaches’ salaries,68 in cases challenging the
association’s student-athlete eligibility rules, courts either held that
the procompetitive benefits of amateurism outweighed any anticompetitive effects, or that the Sherman Act did not even apply to such
“non-commercial” restrictions at all.69
Recently, however, this deferential approach has begun to erode,70
perhaps most notably starting with the landmark case of O’Bannon
v. NCAA, proceedings that helped shape the course of the Alston
litigation in important ways.71 The O’Bannon litigation centered on
the rights of college football and men’s basketball players to receive
compensation for the use of their NIL in both video games and
televised sporting events.72 Following extensive proceedings and a
lengthy bench trial, Judge Claudia Wilken ruled that the NCAA’s
restrictions on athlete pay constituted illicit commercial restraints

67. See 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
68. See id. at 119-20; Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010, 1024 (10th Cir. 1998).
69. See Feldman, supra note 3, at 257-61 (synthesizing cases).
70. See Daniel E. Lazaroff, An Antitrust Exemption for the NCAA: Sound Policy or Letting
the Fox Loose in the Henhouse?, 41 PEPP. L. REV. 229, 230-37 (2014) (reviewing the trend in
the judicial treatment of the NCAA).
71. See 802 F.3d 1049, 1053 (9th Cir. 2015).
72. See Meyer & Zimbalist, supra note 46, at 42-45 (reviewing the “tortured history” of the
O’Bannon litigation).
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in violation of the Sherman Act.73 While conceding that amateurism
played a “limited” role in generating consumer demand for intercollegiate athletics, Judge Wilken nevertheless determined that the
NCAA’s existing rules ran afoul of antitrust law’s rule of reason,
insofar as any procompetitive benefits the amateurism model provided could be obtained through less restrictive means.74 In
particular, Judge Wilken ordered the NCAA to allow its member
schools to set aside up to $5,000 per student-athlete per year in a
trust as compensation for the use of their NIL, payable when an
athlete’s college eligibility was finished.75
Unsurprisingly, the NCAA appealed the district court’s ruling in
O’Bannon to the Ninth Circuit. Although the appellate court agreed
with Judge Wilken’s determination that the NCAA’s student-athlete
compensation rules were subject to antitrust scrutiny,76 the panel
nevertheless took issue with portions of Judge Wilken’s resolution
of the case. Specifically, the court held that requiring the NCAA to
allow its members to set aside up to $5,000 per year for its studentathletes would be fundamentally inconsistent with the concept of
amateurism: “The difference between offering student-athletes
education-related compensation and offering them cash sums
untethered to educational expenses is not minor; it is a quantum
leap.”77 Consequently, the Ninth Circuit reversed that portion of
Judge Wilken’s opinion while nevertheless affirming other education-related remedies in the lower court’s decision (such as the
requirement that the NCAA allow its member schools to provide
their student-athletes with scholarships covering the full cost of
attendance, beyond just tuition, room, board, books, and fees).78
73. O’Bannon v. NCAA, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 988 (N.D. Cal. 2014), aff’d in part, vacated in
part, 802 F.3d 1049.
74. Id. at 1005 (finding that the plaintiffs had established “two legitimate less restrictive
alternatives” for the NCAA’s twin goals of “preserving the popularity of the NCAA’s product
by promoting its current understanding of amateurism and improving the quality of educational opportunities for student-athletes by integrating academics and athletics”).
75. Id. at 1005-08 (“[T]he NCAA could permit its schools to hold in trust limited and equal
shares of its licensing revenue to be distributed to its student-athletes after they leave college
or their eligibility expires.”).
76. O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1064 (“[W]e accept Board of Regents’ guidance as informative
with respect to the procompetitive purposes served by the NCAA’s amateurism rules, but we
will go no further than that. The amateurism rules’ validity must be proved, not presumed.”).
77. Id. at 1078.
78. Id. at 1075-76 (“The district court’s determination that the existing compensation
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During the period between the trial and appellate court rulings
in O’Bannon, two new lawsuits were filed against the NCAA by a
group of then-current and former college football and men’s and
women’s basketball players. Both of these new cases launched a
much broader challenge against the NCAA’s student-athlete compensation regulations. In Alston v. NCAA and Jenkins v. NCAA—
both later consolidated in the court of Judge Wilken under the
moniker In re National Collegiate Athletic Association Athletic
Grant-In-Aid Cap Antitrust Litigation79—the plaintiffs contended
that NCAA rules restricting schools from providing cash compensation to players constituted a form of illegal price fixing in violation
of the Sherman Act.80 Put differently, the cases effectively sought to
force the NCAA to implement “a free market for college football and
... basketball players.”81
Although portions of these litigations were ultimately settled,82
Judge Wilken eventually issued a ruling once again condemning
the NCAA’s athlete compensation restrictions under antitrust law.83
However, because the Ninth Circuit’s decision in O’Bannon had
determined that any judicial relief “untethered” to education would
be incompatible with the NCAA’s tradition of amateurism, Judge
rules violate Section 1 of the Sherman Act was correct and its injunction requiring the NCAA
to permit schools to provide compensation up to the full cost of attendance was proper.”).
79. See James Landry & Thomas A. Baker III, Change or Be Changed: A Proposal for the
NCAA to Combat Corruption and Unfairness by Proactively Reforming Its Regulation of
Athlete Publicity Rights, 9 N.Y.U. J. INTELL. PROP. & ENT. L. 1, 28 (2019) (“Alston v. NCAA
and Jenkins v. NCAA ... were consolidated into In re National Collegiate Athletic Association
Athletic Grant-In-Aid Cap Antitrust Litigation.” (citing In re NCAA Athletic Grant-In-Aid Cap
Antitrust Litig., 375 F. Supp. 3d 1058, 1065 n.5 (N.D. Cal. 2019))).
80. See Horton et al., supra note 2, at 381 (observing that the “Jenkins class action
directly attacks the NCAA’s eligibility rules” (citing Complaint, Jenkins v. NCAA, No. 1401678, 2014 WL 1008526 (D.N.J. Mar. 17, 2014), ECF No. 1)).
81. Benjamin A. Tulis & Gregg E. Clifton, Ninth Circuit Holds NCAA Subject to Antitrust
Scrutiny, but Vacates Injunction Allowing up to $5,000 Per Year Deferred Compensation to
College Athletes, NAT’L L. REV. (Oct. 1, 2015) (emphasis omitted), http://www.natlawreview.
com/article/ninth-circuit-holds-ncaa-subject-to-antitrust-scrutiny-vacates-injunction-allowing
[https://perma.cc/P9H9-M5XK].
82. In particular, the “plaintiffs in the Alston case and the NCAA reached a settlement
for $209 million to cover the additional amount that Alston and his colleagues might have
been paid” had the NCAA moved to allow colleges to offer scholarships covering the full cost
of attendance at an earlier date. Sanderson & Siegfried, supra note 28, at 205.
83. In re NCAA Athletic Grant-In-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig., 375 F. Supp. 3d 1058, 1110
(N.D. Cal. 2019), aff’d, 958 F.3d 1239 (9th Cir. 2020), aff’d sub nom. NCAA v. Alston, 141 S.
Ct. 2141 (2021) [hereinafter NCAA Antitrust Litig.].
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Wilken found herself “constrained” with respect to the relief she
could order the association to provide to the plaintiffs.84 Consequently, Judge Wilken enjoined the NCAA from preventing its
members from offering their student-athletes noncash, educationrelated benefits beyond their scholarships.85 Such benefits, she
noted, might include “computers, science equipment, musical instruments and other items not currently included in the cost of
attendance calculation but nonetheless related to the pursuit of
various academic studies.”86 The Ninth Circuit affirmed this decision on appeal,87 setting the stage for the NCAA to seek—and
ultimately be granted—Supreme Court review.88
The NCAA hoped to convince the Supreme Court to rule that its
athlete eligibility rules were beyond the scope of federal antitrust
law.89 Specifically, the association relied heavily on language from
the Court’s decision in the 1984 Board of Regents case, where
Justice Stevens wrote that “the NCAA seeks to market a particular
brand of football—college football,” a hallmark of which was the
expectation that the “athletes must not be paid, must be required to
attend class, and the like.”90 The Board of Regents opinion then went
on to state:
The NCAA plays a critical role in the maintenance of a revered
tradition of amateurism in college sports. There can be no
question but that it needs ample latitude to play that role, or
that the preservation of the student-athlete in higher education
adds richness and diversity to intercollegiate athletics and is
entirely consistent with the goals of the Sherman Act.91

84. Gould, supra note 5, at 169-70.
85. NCAA Antitrust Litig., 375 F. Supp. 3d at 1109 (“Current NCAA limits on other
education-related benefits that can be provided on top of a grant-in-aid are invalidated. The
NCAA may not limit these benefits in the future.”).
86. Id. at 1088.
87. In re NCAA Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig., 958 F.3d at 1270-71.
88. NCAA v. Alston, 141 S. Ct. 1231 (2020) (mem.), cert. granted In re NCAA Athletic
Grant-In-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig., 958 F.3d 1239.
89. See NCAA v. Alston, 141 S. Ct. 2141, 2147 (2021).
90. 468 U.S. 85, 101-02 (1984).
91. Id. at 120.
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The NCAA interpreted these passages as effectively blessing its
amateurism model, thereby foreclosing any antitrust challenge to its
eligibility rules.92
A unanimous Supreme Court rejected the NCAA’s interpretation
of Board of Regents in Alston, however.93 In an opinion authored by
Justice Gorsuch, the Court ruled that the language relied on by the
NCAA effectively amounted to dicta, insofar as the association’s
television broadcast restrictions—and not its amateurism rules—
had been at issue in the Board of Regents case.94 Moreover, the
Court noted that current circumstances had changed markedly,
rendering any conclusions regarding the legal status of college
sports in 1984 inapt today:
When it comes to college sports, there can be little doubt that
the market realities have changed significantly since 1984. Since
then, the NCAA has dramatically increased the amounts and
kinds of benefits schools may provide to student-athletes.... Nor
is that all that has changed. In 1985, Division I football and
basketball raised approximately $922 million and $41 million
respectively. By 2016, NCAA Division I schools raised more than
$13.5 billion. From 1982 to 1984, CBS paid $16 million per year
to televise the March Madness Division I men’s basketball
tournament. In 2016, those annual television rights brought in
closer to $1.1 billion.95

Thus, even if the Board of Regents Court had intended to broadly
immunize the NCAA’s eligibility rules from antitrust challenge, the
Alston Court believed that the dramatically increased commercialization of the industry would have subsequently undermined the
continued vitality of such a holding today.
Nor was the Court willing to create a new exemption for the
NCAA out of whole cloth: “This Court has regularly refused materially identical requests from litigants seeking special dispensation
92. See Alston, 141 S. Ct. at 2157-58 (“On the NCAA’s telling, these observations foreclose
any rule of reason review in this suit.”).
93. See id. at 2167 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).
94. Id. at 2158 (majority opinion) (“[T]hese remarks do not suggest that courts must reflexively reject all challenges to the NCAA’s compensation restrictions. Student-athlete compensation rules were not even at issue in Board of Regents.”).
95. Id. (citations omitted).
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from the Sherman Act.”96 Instead, the Court explained, any such
grant of immunity must come from Congress.97 As a result, the
Alston Court made clear that, moving forward, all NCAA rules and
regulations are subject to scrutiny under the Sherman Act.98
Nevertheless, the immediate practical effect of the Court’s majority decision in Alston was rather modest. Although the Court
clearly ruled that the NCAA’s student-athlete compensation and
eligibility rules were subject to the Sherman Act, the majority
merely upheld the rather narrow relief that Judge Wilken had
granted (which had itself been constrained by the Ninth Circuit’s
decision in O’Bannon).99 Indeed, the Court noted in several different
passages in its opinion that it was only rendering judgment on the
legality of the NCAA’s restraints on education-related benefits
because the plaintiffs had declined to appeal the lower courts’
rejection of their broader attack on the NCAA’s compensation and
eligibility rules.100
Justice Kavanaugh was not nearly as restrained in his concurring
opinion in the case, however. Justice Kavanaugh added his concurring opinion “to underscore that the NCAA’s remaining compensation rules also raise serious questions under the antitrust laws.”101
Observing that “[t]he bottom line is that the NCAA and its member
colleges are suppressing the pay of student athletes who collectively
generate billions of dollars in revenues for colleges every year,”102
Justice Kavanaugh contended that such a “business model would be
flatly illegal in almost any other industry in America.”103 This

96. Id. at 2159.
97. Id. at 2160 (“The NCAA is free to argue that, ‘because of the special characteristics of
[its] particular industry,’ it should be exempt from the usual operation of the antitrust laws—
but that appeal is ‘properly addressed to Congress.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Nat’l
Soc’y of Pro. Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 689 (1978))).
98. Id. at 2159 (“[T]he NCAA itself is subject to the Sherman Act.”).
99. See id.; O’Bannon v. NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049, 1079 (9th Cir. 2015).
100. See Alston, 141 S. Ct. at 2154-55 (“For their part, the student-athletes do not renew
their across-the-board challenge to the NCAA’s compensation restrictions. Accordingly, we do
not pass on the rules that remain in place or the district court’s judgement upholding them....
[T]he student-athletes do not question that the NCAA may permissibly seek to justify its
restraints in the labor market by pointing to procompetitive effects they produce in the
consumer market.... With all these matters taken as given, we express no views on them.”).
101. Id. at 2166-67 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).
102. Id. at 2168.
103. Id. at 2167.
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exploitation was particularly troubling to Justice Kavanaugh in
light of the fact that “the student athletes who generate the revenues” are disproportionately “African American and from lowerincome backgrounds.”104 Thus, Justice Kavanaugh concluded:
Nowhere else in America can businesses get away with agreeing
not to pay their workers a fair market rate on the theory that
their product is defined by not paying their workers a fair market rate. And under ordinary principles of antitrust law, it is not
evident why college sports should be any different. The NCAA is
not above the law.105

Consequently, one need not read too closely between the lines of
the Court’s decision in Alston to conclude that the NCAA’s amateurism rules are in grave danger of being struck down by the judiciary
in a future lawsuit. The majority’s opinion makes clear that courts
should not shield the NCAA’s amateurism model from full antitrust
scrutiny when applying the Sherman Act in future cases. And
Justice Kavanaugh’s concurring opinion shows that at least one
member of the Court was seemingly prepared to rule that the
NCAA’s entire system of amateurism ran afoul of federal antitrust
law had the posture of the litigation allowed him to do so.
Indeed, the Alston Court’s holding that the NCAA’s athlete compensation rules are subject to full antitrust scrutiny all but spells
doom for the association’s amateurism tradition. Typically, courts
applying the Sherman Act to other industries have rejected
noneconomic arguments related to the social welfare benefits of an
otherwise anticompetitive restraint.106 Applying that same line of
reasoning to the NCAA, then, would suggest that any of the
purported societal benefits of amateurism would now be given relatively little weight when balanced against the clear deleterious
104. Id. at 2168.
105. Id. at 2169.
106. See Feldman, supra note 3, at 253-54 (“[T]he Supreme Court has consistently rejected
social welfare justifications in antitrust analysis.” (citing Peter Kreher, Antitrust Theory,
College Sports, and Interleague Rulemaking: A New Critique of the NCAA’s Amateurism Rules,
6 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 51, 85 (2006))); Horton et al., supra note 2, at 384 (“The Supreme
Court long has recognized that economic regulations seeking to implement the types of social
and moral values and benefits that the NCAA espouses are ‘properly addressed to Congress.’”
(quoting Nat’l Soc’y of Pro. Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 689 (1978))).
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financial impact that the association’s rules have on the market for
student-athletes’ labor.
For its part, the NCAA appeared to immediately recognize the
writing on the wall. Within days of the Alston ruling, the association
announced it would not be promulgating any of its long-anticipated
rules regulating student-athletes’ monetization of their NIL rights—
a decision that some commentators attributed to the fear that any
such restrictions would merely invite a future antitrust challenge.107
Meanwhile, the NCAA’s subsequent decision to overhaul its constitution in order to decentralize and disperse its regulatory authority
amongst its member institutions and conferences evidences a similar desire to avoid antitrust liability on a going-forward basis.108
Consequently, following Alston, it may only be a matter of time
before a large swath of the college sports industry—whether
voluntarily or as the result of a court order—is compelled to implement free-market competition for the services of their studentathletes. And although little doubt exists that such an outcome
would be a welcome and long-overdue corrective for the NCAA’s
exploitative treatment of its student-athletes in the eyes of many,
there are nevertheless compelling reasons to doubt whether such an
outcome would ultimately prove sustainable for the industry.
III. DECENTRALIZATION IS UNLIKELY TO FIX THE
COLLEGE SPORTS INDUSTRY
As well-founded as the criticisms of the NCAA’s current model of
intercollegiate athletics may be, nevertheless, compelling reasons
exist to believe that the association’s coming decentralization— with
much greater regulatory authority vested at the individual school
or conference level—will fail to most effectively advance the greater
107. See ASSOCIATED PRESS, NCAA’s Mark Emmert Says ‘This Is the Right Time’ to
Consider Decentralized, Deregulated College Sports, ESPN (July 15, 2021), https://www.
espn.com/college-sports/story/_/id/31824357/ncaa-president-mark-emmert-says-right-considerdecentralized-deregulated-college-sports [https://perma.cc/SWM7-XNYT] (quoting Big 12
commissioner Bob Bowlsby as stating that the NCAA opted not to enact NIL regulations in
order to “prevent us from getting sued”).
108. See, e.g., Michael McCann, NCAA Draft Constitution Heeds Alston’s Antitrust
Warnings, SPORTICO (Nov. 9, 2021, 12:30 PM), https://www.sportico.com/law/analysis/2021/
ncaa-constitution-1234646189/ [https://perma.cc/6AZ5-37VY] (explaining how a decentralized
NCAA structure reduces the industry’s potential antitrust liability).
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public interest. Part of this stems from the atypical organizational
structure of college athletic departments—and the unusual
economic incentives that result—as discussed in Part I above.109 At
the same time, however, the industry also faces atypical legal constraints that will likely prevent the NCAA and its member schools
from effectively adjusting to a world of increased institutional
autonomy and unrestrained economic competition for the services
of college athletes of the sort hinted at in Alston.110 As a result, several undesirable implications are likely to result from the NCAA’s
intended decentralization of the college sports industry.
A. The Legal Constraints on the NCAA and Its Schools
As discussed above, following Alston, any attempt by the NCAA
to regulate how its member schools compensate their studentathletes will likely be met with an antitrust lawsuit, one that the
association may find difficult to win given the current state of the
law.111 Importantly, not only does this mean that any NCAA bylaws
(or other agreement between a critical mass of universities)
restricting the compensation of student-athletes via non-educationrelated cash benefits would be at risk of being struck down in future
lawsuits, so too would any attempt by the NCAA or its members to
cap the amount of money its schools are permitted to collectively
pay their players in a pay-for-play world.112 In other words, should
109. See supra Part I.
110. See infra Part III.A.
111. See supra note 106 and accompanying text (discussing how antitrust law typically
disfavors arguments based on noneconomic considerations such as the alleged social value of
amateurism).
112. To be sure, the Supreme Court has previously suggested that attempts to promote
competitive balance among the members of a sports league would provide a potential procompetitive justification for a challenged restraint under the rule of reason. See Am. Needle,
Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 560 U.S. 183, 204 (2010) (“We have recognized, for example,
‘that the interest in maintaining a competitive balance’ among ‘athletic teams is legitimate
and important.’” (quoting NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 117 (1984))).
And although an attempt to cap the ability of NCAA schools to pay their student-athletes
could be viewed as a competitive-balance-enhancing measure, it seems unlikely that a court
would hold that this beneficial aspect of the restraint outweighed the harm inflicted on the
players. Indeed, as discussed later, U.S. professional sports leagues have only been able to
impose a salary cap on their players after collectively bargaining the provision with their
respective players union, thereby immunizing the provision under the nonstatutory labor
exemption to the antitrust laws. See infra notes 115-17.
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the NCAA member schools determine that some sort of salary cap
(or related mechanism) is necessary to ensure a level of competitive
balance amongst their teams, the industry currently lacks the lawful ability to implement any such measure.
U.S. professional sports leagues have long recognized that unrestrained competition for the services of players could have
negative ramifications for the quality of their product overall, as
sporting competition typically becomes less attractive to the public
when the wealthiest teams are consistently able to utilize their
financial advantages to acquire the services of the best (and thus,
the most expensive) players.113 Consequently, each of the major U.S.
professional sports leagues has adopted some form of salary cap (or
analogous salary restraint) to equalize the level of spending
amongst their teams for competitive balance purposes.114 Although
113. See ANDREW ZIMBALIST, MAY THE BEST TEAM WIN: BASEBALL ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC
POLICY 35 (2004) (“Conventional wisdom has it that a successful team sports league must
have a healthy dose of competitive balance or parity across its teams. Without such balance,
there will not be the necessary uncertainty of outcome in individual games and in seasons to
maintain fan interest.”).
Admittedly, some international professional sports leagues have thrived without a salary
cap, perhaps most notably England’s Premier League in soccer. Cf. Ashton E. Stine,
Comment, Unsportsmanlike Conduct—Calling a Penalty on the NFLPA and NHLPA’s Duty
of Fair Representation for Entering Players, 24 CHAP. L. REV. 303, 310 (2020) (“The salary
control exhibited in American sports can be contrasted with the five major European soccer
leagues: England’s Premier League, Italy’s Serie A, Spain’s La Liga, Germany’s Bundesliga,
and France’s Ligue 1, which all lack a salary cap or luxury tax structure, resulting in staggering salary inequality.” (citing Global Sports Salaries Survey 2018, SPORTING INTEL. (Nov.
25, 2018), https://globalsportssalaries.com/GSSS%202018.pdf [https://perma.cc/KQX9-GCJ7])).
Be that as it may, the even greater deficit spending patterns that are likely to emerge from
unrestrained free-market competition for the services of student-athletes in the U.S. college
sports industry raises a number of different policy concerns due to their resulting implications
for the higher education industry as a whole. See infra Part III.B.
114. See Thomas M. Schiera, Note, Balancing Act: Will the European Commission Allow
European Football to Reestablish the Competitive Balance that It Helped Destroy?, 32 BROOK.
J. INT’L L. 709, 722, 724 (2007) (“All four major professional sports leagues in the United
States have some form of salary cap.” (footnote omitted)). Although professional baseball
players have famously avoided the implementation of an actual salary cap in their league,
Major League Baseball’s luxury tax penalizes teams for spending over a certain amount of
money each year on player salaries and thus has effectively served to deter teams from
spending too much on their team payroll. See Matthew J. Parlow, Restarting Professional
Sports During a Global Pandemic, 59 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 227, 236 (2021) (“MLB does not
have a salary cap but does impose a luxury tax, which it refers to as the competitive balance
tax, to achieve its parity goals.” (citing Brett Pollard, Note, Creating Economic Equality
Among Major League Baseball Franchises: The Removal of Major League Baseball’s Archaic
Antitrust Exemption, 18 TEX. REV. ENT. & SPORTS L. 49, 50-51 (2016))).
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such an agreement among thirty or more independently owned and
operated businesses to restrain the pay of their employees would
normally be a clear violation of the Sherman Act, these leagues are
nevertheless able to legally impose such salary restraints under a
legal doctrine known as the nonstatutory labor exemption.115
Specifically, the nonstatutory exemption generally shields employment-related restraints from antitrust scrutiny so long as the
affected employees have agreed to the restrictions through their
certified union and the collective bargaining process.116 In the case
of a salary cap, because professional players have consented to these
restraints as part of their validly negotiated collective bargaining
agreement with the league’s ownership, these salary restrictions can
no longer be challenged under the Sherman Act.117
Unfortunately for the NCAA and its members, there are several
reasons why collective bargaining does not offer a realistic path
forward for the negotiation of a salary cap with their studentathletes.118 First, the National Labor Relations Act—the statutory
provision creating a right to unionize and collectively bargain119—
generally applies only to those workers who are characterized as
“employees” under the law.120 Federal courts have, to date,
115. Sean W.L. Alford, Comment, Dusting Off the AK-47: An Examination of NFL Players’
Most Powerful Weapon in an Antitrust Lawsuit Against the NFL, 88 N.C. L. REV. 212, 232
(2009) (“Salary caps in sports leagues have rarely been considered under antitrust scrutiny
due to courts’ rigorous application of the nonstatutory labor exemption.” (first citing Brown
v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231, 250 (1996); then citing Wood v. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, 809
F.2d 954, 959 (2d Cir. 1987); and then citing Nat’l Basketball Ass’n v. Williams, 857 F. Supp.
1069, 1078 (S.D.N.Y. 1994), aff ’d, 45 F.3d 684 (2d Cir. 1995))).
116. See Clarett v. Nat’l Football League, 369 F.3d 124, 130-31 (2d Cir. 2004) (explaining
that the nonstatutory labor exemption is intended “‘to allow meaningful collective bargaining
to take place’ by protecting ‘some restraints on competition imposed through the bargaining
process’ from antitrust scrutiny” (quoting Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231, 237
(1996))).
117. See Wood v. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, 809 F.2d 954, 959 (2d Cir. 1987) (rejecting a
challenge to the NBA’s salary cap in light of the nonstatutory labor exemption).
118. See Meyer & Zimbalist, supra note 46, at 52 (observing that “collective bargaining” in
the college sports industry “seems beyond reach”).
119. See Hannah Esquenazi, Note, Who Can “Seize the Day?”: Analyzing Who Is an
“Employee” for Purposes of Unionization and Collective Bargaining Through the Lens of the
“Newsie” Strike of 1899, 59 B.C. L. REV. 2551, 2551 (2018) (“[T]he National Labor Relations
Act (NLRA) ... protect[s] employees’ rights to unionize, collectively bargain, and strike.”).
120. Id. at 2553 (noting that “the question of whether workers constituted ‘employees’” has
historically “decided whether they could form a union and bargain with their employer”
(quoting National Labor Relations Act § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2018))).
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consistently ruled that NCAA student-athletes are not employees of
their universities,121 and therefore these players would not be eligible to unionize to negotiate terms with the NCAA or its schools.122
Without a union, then, there is no path forward for the NCAA to
rely on the nonstatutory labor exemption.
Second, even if NCAA players were legally considered to be
employees of their universities, only those student-athletes enrolled
at certain Division I schools would be eligible to unionize. The
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) specifically excludes employees of state and local governmental entities from its coverage,
so its unionization provisions would only apply to student-athletes
“employed” by private universities.123 Meanwhile, the right of public
employees to unionize is instead governed by the provisions of each
respective state’s own constitution and labor laws.124
Thus, even if student-athletes were characterized as employees,
only those players enrolled at one of the seventeen private institutions within the NCAA’s Division I, along with those playing for
state universities in jurisdictions allowing public-sector unions,
would have the right to collectively bargain. Consequently, although
a professional league can negotiate a single collective bargaining
agreement with all of its players—thereby placing all of its teams on
equal competitive footing—any collectively bargained caps on
student-athlete compensation in the college sports industry would
at most apply only to a subset of schools, preventing the NCAA
from implementing uniform rules across its membership. This limitation would, in turn, substantially limit the effectiveness of any
such salary restraints from a competitive-balance standpoint.

121. See, e.g., Berger v. NCAA, 843 F.3d 285, 288 (7th Cir. 2016); Dawson v. NCAA, 250 F.
Supp. 3d 401, 403 (N.D. Cal. 2017), aff ’d, 932 F.3d 905 (9th Cir. 2019).
122. For its part, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) has officially remained
noncommittal on the question of student-athletes’ employment status, as discussed in greater
detail below. See infra notes 128-31 and accompanying text.
123. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (excluding employees of state and local government from NLRA
protection).
124. See Nicholas Fram & T. Ward Frampton, A Union of Amateurs: A Legal Blueprint to
Reshape Big-Time College Athletics, 60 BUFF. L. REV. 1003, 1009 (2012) (stating that “state
labor law dictates whether” public employees of state governments have a right to unionize
(first citing 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (2006); and then citing Leroy D. Clark, New Directions for the
Civil Rights Movement: College Athletics as a Civil Rights Issue, 36 HOW. L.J. 259, 278 n.53
(1993))).
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The impracticality of the potential unionization of NCAA studentathletes was highlighted in the matter of Northwestern University
& College Athletes Players Ass’n, a proceeding arising from the
attempted unionization of Northwestern University’s scholarship
football players.125 In that case, a regional office of the NLRB had
initially ruled that scholarship football players were employees of
Northwestern because the school closely controlled the players’ daily
schedules and expressly conditioned their continued scholarship
eligibility (that is, “compensation”) on the players performing forty
to fifty hours of football-related activity per week during the
season.126 As a result, the regional office allowed an election to be
held to determine whether a majority of the Northwestern football
team supported the unionization effort.127
The regional NLRB decision was appealed to the national office.128
There, the full NLRB declined to resolve the question of whether
the Northwestern players were properly characterized as employees
of the university, instead declining to assert jurisdiction over the
case on the grounds that subjecting college sports to federal labor
law “would not effectuate the purposes of the [NLRA].”129 Specifically, the NLRB feared that even though only a portion of studentathletes would be eligible to collectively bargain with their universities—due to the restrictions placed on the unionization of state
employees discussed above130—any terms one school and its players
negotiated would inevitably have ramifications for other institutions
by specifying rules relating to the playing conditions for athletic
competition.131 Recognizing that “such an arrangement [would]
125. Nw. Univ. & Coll. Athletes Players Ass’n, 362 N.L.R.B. 1350 (2015).
126. Decision and Direction of Election at 2, 5-6, Nw. Univ. & Coll. Athletes Players Ass’n,
No. 13-RC-121359 (N.L.R.B. Mar. 26, 2014); see also Marc Edelman, The Future of College
Athlete Players Unions: Lessons Learned from Northwestern University and Potential Next
Steps in the College Athletes’ Rights Movement, 38 CARDOZO L. REV. 1627, 1637-39 (2017)
(summarizing the regional decision).
127. See Michael H. LeRoy, How a “Labor Dispute” Would Help the NCAA, 81 U. CHI. L.
REV. ONLINE 44, 44 (2014), https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article
=1026&context=uclrev_online [https://perma.cc/RS2U-5WB2] (reporting that the NLRB’s
“regional director determined that Northwestern University football players” were “eligible
to vote in a union-representation election”).
128. Northwestern, 362 N.L.R.B. at 1350.
129. Id.
130. See supra notes 123-24 and accompanying text.
131. Northwestern, 362 N.L.R.B. at 1354 (“Many terms applied to one team therefore would
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seemingly [be] unprecedented” in the sports industry, the Board
concluded that this outcome “would not promote stability in labor
relations.”132 As a result, the Board rejected the Northwestern
unionization effort.133
Consequently, unlike their professional counterparts, the NCAA
and its member institutions find themselves in an unusual legal
posture, one in which any attempt to apply consistent spending
limits across competing teams is, in effect, legally untenable.134
Because collective bargaining is not presently an option—and even
if it were, would only apply on an uneven, institution-by-institution
basis—the NCAA cannot rely on the nonstatutory labor exemption
to shield any spending caps that it may wish to place on its membership from an antitrust challenge.135 Thus, any attempt to enhance
competitive balance by imposing a salary cap (or similar restraint)
in a future pay-for-play world would, post-Alston, likely be struck
down as an illicit restraint of trade under the Sherman Act.
At the same time, the present inability of student-athletes to
unionize will also hamper any efforts to impose industry-wide
reforms better protecting the players’ educational and medical
interests. Because student-athletes cannot currently bargain collectively for additional protections in these areas, any hope for
industry-wide reform rests with the NCAA. However, with the association poised to cede substantial portions of its rulemaking power
back to individual universities and conferences, the industry’s
coming decentralization will make it harder to impose safeguards
applicable to all NCAA schools in the future.136 Although some
likely have ramifications for other teams.”).
132. Id.
133. Id. at 1355-56. Although the NLRB’s new general counsel under the Biden
administration has recently suggested that a reconsideration of this decision may be in order,
see David W. Chen, Labor Memo Amounts to New Stance from Feds Against the N.C.A.A., N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 29, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/09/29/sports/ncaafootball/ncaa-labormemo-student-athletes-unionize.html [https://perma.cc/N6CA-LLBN] (“Jennifer A. Abruzzo,
the N.L.R.B.’s general counsel ... warned in a memo ... that universities ‘misclassifying such
employees as mere “student-athletes”’ could be threatened with legal action for creating a
‘chilling effect’ on athletes who wanted to organize.”), the underlying pragmatic concerns
regarding stability in labor relations expressed by the full NLRB in the Northwestern case
nevertheless remain.
134. See Fram & Frampton, supra note 124, at 1009.
135. See Clarett v. Nat’l Football League, 369 F.3d 124, 130-31 (2d Cir. 2004).
136. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
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individual universities or conferences may elect to impose such
reforms on themselves voluntarily, history would suggest that many
others will fail to do so, instead choosing to prioritize competitive
success on the playing field.137 As a result, although the coming
changes to the college sports industry will likely result in greater
economic competition between schools, this transformation is unlikely to resolve many of the other commonly criticized aspects of
the current system.
B. The Likely Implications of Decentralization and Unrestrained
Salary Competition for College Sports
The foregoing analysis has established three key points: (1) the
college sports industry’s unusual industrial organization—featuring
nonprofit organizations engaged in fierce, zero-sum competition—
incentivizes many schools to both spend far greater resources on
their athletic departments than those sports programs generate and
deemphasize their student-athletes’ best educational and health
interests;138 (2) following Alston, any attempt by the NCAA to
restrict its member schools from providing monetary compensation
to their student-athletes is highly vulnerable to being successfully
challenged under antitrust law;139 and (3) structural legal constraints prevent NCAA schools from collectively bargaining with
players to implement measures to restrict and equalize spending
of the sort that have been widely adopted and viewed as essential by
the U.S. professional sports leagues, or that would better protect the
educational and medical well-being of student-athletes on an industry-wide basis.140
Taken together, these observations would suggest that the
NCAA’s planned decentralization—and the relaxing of restrictions
on student-athlete compensation that will presumably follow—will
likely trigger several undesirable implications. First, as noted
above, any industry-wide reforms protecting student-athletes’
educational and medical interests will likely prove harder to obtain,
as it will fall to individual conferences and schools to overcome the
137.
138.
139.
140.

See supra notes 59-66 and accompanying text (discussing historical examples).
See supra Part I.
See supra notes 97-98 and accompanying text.
See supra Part III.A.
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countervailing competitive concerns in order to implement such
measures.141
Second, the resulting increase in financial competition between
schools for the services of prospective student-athletes—and especially those in the highest-profile sports—can also be expected to
result in several other arguably less-than-desirable implications for
society (despite the benefits that may flow to those players the
NCAA’s amateurism model currently exploits). Specifically, should
the NCAA allow its schools to pay their players, one would expect
that the wealthiest athletic programs—those roughly two dozen that
turn a profit on their sports teams each year142—would quickly move
to parlay their existing financial advantages into even greater
competitive advantages on the playing field.143 As a result, one could
reasonably anticipate that a shift to a pay-for-play model in college
athletics would further exacerbate the industry’s existing competitive disparities (in which a handful of historically dominant
programs already win a disproportionate amount of their games).144
This would inflict a societal cost by threatening to further decrease
the attractiveness of a historically popular and culturally embedded
form of entertainment.145
Less financially successful athletic programs would thus, in turn,
be faced with two suboptimal choices: either unilaterally relent,
thereby ceding a permanent competitive advantage to the richest
programs, or else place even greater financial demands on their
141. See Nw. Univ. & Coll. Athletes Players Ass’n, 362 N.L.R.B. 1350, 1354 (2015).
142. See Mitten & Ross, supra note 34, at 846.
143. See Sanderson & Siegfried, supra note 28, at 191 (“Small differences in spending can
yield large advantages in recruiting and subsequently in winning. Unsuccessful programs
have little choice but to ratchet up spending, or they may fall even farther behind in the
competition for players and coaches, with devastating effects on their revenues.”).
144. See McDavis, supra note 39, at 282-83 (“[U]nbridled competition ... can lead to an
environment that lacks competitive balance—where a few teams dominate all others.” (citing
Stefan Szymanski, The Sporting Exception and the Legality of Restraints in the US, in
HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF SPORTS 730, 730 (Edward Elgar 2006))).
145. To be sure, some would undoubtedly argue that substantial competitive imbalance
already exists in college sports. See, e.g., Neal Newman, Let’s Get Serious—The Clear Case for
Compensating the Student Athlete—By the Numbers: A University of Michigan Athletic
Program Case Study, 51 N.M. L. REV. 37, 54 (2021) (“The fact of the matter is that a
disproportionate distribution of talent already exists.”). Although this may be true, the
addition of unregulated cash payments to players to the mix is only likely to expand the gap
between the handful of richest and most historically dominant programs and the rest of the
field, further exacerbating the already existing competitive dynamics.
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already strained budgets in an effort to keep pace with their rivals.
Considering the immense pressure that college administrators face
to field winning athletic programs,146 relatively few schools are
likely to opt for the first option. Instead, many Division I universities would undoubtedly elect to attempt to continue to compete with
their wealthier counterparts by offering similar financial packages
to prospective student-athletes.
This competition would force these more budget-strapped programs to try to address any new cost overruns in one of two ways.
First, schools could elect to cover some of the added cost imposed by
an unregulated pay-for-play regime by diverting a greater share of
their general university operating budgets to their athletic departments.147 In many cases, these costs will ultimately be recouped
through increases in tuition and fees for the schools’ general student
population,148 further exacerbating the existing college tuition and
student-debt crises.149
Alternatively, schools could attempt to make room in their
existing athletic budgets by repurposing some of their current
expenditures to help offset the cost of additional financial compensation for their student-athletes.150 For instance, one might anticipate
that some schools would opt to shift a portion of the money they
already spend on their football programs—whether for coaching
salaries or other amenities provided to their student-athletes—in
order to cover the cost of providing cash compensation to their

146. See supra note 53 and accompanying text; see also Zimbalist, supra note 35 (observing
that university athletic “programs ... have stakeholders (boosters, alumni, state legislators,
students) pressuring for victories”).
147. See Sanderson & Siegfried, supra note 28, at 190 (noting that U.S. colleges and
universities already collectively transfer more than $1 billion per year in general student fees
and tuition to their athletic departments).
148. Cf. McDavis, supra note 39, at 280 (reporting that 90 percent of Division I schools
already subsidize their athletic departments from general university funds (citing Phil
Mushnick, Colleges Cutting Sports for ‘Revenue’ Doesn’t Add Up at All, N.Y. POST (Dec. 28,
2013, 6:27 PM), https://nypost.com/2013/12/28/colleges-cutting-sports-for-revenue-doesnt-addup-at-all/)).
149. See, e.g., Camilla E. Watson, Federal Financing of Higher Education at a Crossroads:
The Evolution of the Student Loan Debt Crisis and the Reauthorization of the Higher
Education Act of 1965, 2019 MICH. ST. L. REV. 883, 976 (acknowledging the “high cost of
tuition, and crisis level student loan debt”).
150. See Newman, supra note 145, at 41 (contending that “sharing, prioritizing, and reallocating” existing funds would allow athletic departments to compensate student-athletes).
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football players.151 Again, however, the wealthiest and most successful programs would likely view this as an opportunity to flex
their financial muscle and further separate themselves from the
pack on the playing field by forgoing any such accompanying budget
reductions. As a result, many budget-challenged programs may be
reluctant to cede too much ground in one area—such as coaching
salaries—simply to keep pace in another.
Realistically, then, rather than simply elect to absorb the cost of
paying their athletes in a particular sport exclusively by reallocating a portion of their team’s existing budget, many schools would
instead likely look to achieve cost savings in other areas to support
additional expenditures for the highest-profile sports. One of the
most likely ways that schools would achieve these budget cuts would
be to eliminate several less popular, non-revenue-generating sports
teams (such as track and field, swimming, field hockey, et cetera).152
Indeed, history has shown that when facing financial challenges in
their athletic departments, universities will seldom elect to substantially cut the budget of their football or men’s basketball
programs; instead, they typically reduce these budgetary pressures
by eliminating one or more of their less popular teams.153
Although reasonable minds can certainly disagree on the extent
to which universities ought to be expending hundreds of thousands
(or millions) of dollars on sports programs that fail to generate selfsupporting revenue,154 any significant reduction in the number of
nonrevenue sports teams U.S. colleges and universities field would
151. See id.
152. Cf. Dillon J. Besser, Note, The Forgotten Party in O’Bannon v. National Collegiate
Athletic Association: How Non-Revenue Sports Operate in a Changing Intercollegiate
Marketplace, 101 IOWA L. REV. 2105, 2131 (2016) (referencing a warning by “Pac-12
Commissioner Larry Scott ... that compensating athletes in the major sports could [lead to]
the demise of non-revenue sports” (citing Jon Solomon, If Football, Men’s Basketball Players
Get Paid, What About Women?, CBS SPORTS (June 5, 2014, 5:52 AM), https://www.
cbssports.com/college-football/news/if-football-mens-basketball-players-get-paid-what-aboutwomen/)).
153. See id. at 2125 (observing that “some Division I institutions” elected to “eliminat[e]
some sports programs” in order to cover the cost of the “change to [full] cost-of-attendance
scholarships”); McDavis, supra note 39, at 280-81 (listing examples of nonrevenue sports
being cut to offset budget deficits).
154. Compare Ross, supra note 2, at 950 (contending that schools should not offer athletic
scholarships or robust coaching for sports that do not turn a profit), with McDavis, supra note
39, at 334-35 (discussing the ancillary benefits provided by non-revenue-generating sports
programs).
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have several notable policy implications. First, such a reduction
would have important, but often overlooked, ramifications for the
nation’s current Olympic training model. Indeed, the United States
Olympic & Paralympic Committee relies heavily on the intercollegiate athletics industry to prepare and train the nation’s Olympic
athletes for competition in a variety of traditionally non-revenuegenerating sports.155 Therefore, any significant reduction in the
number of nonrevenue sports teams could meaningfully impact the
nation’s current Olympic training model, forcing the country to
explore alternative methods of preparing its athletes for competition
in high-profile Olympic sports such as swimming and track and
field. At the same time, such a reduction would also threaten to
reduce access to education in at least some student-athlete populations, thereby decreasing the availability of opportunities for these
athletes to “leverage their athletic abilities into academic achievement that might otherwise be unavailable to them.”156
Consequently, the introduction of unregulated “pay-for-play” in
college sports can reasonably be anticipated to carry with it some
combination of the following, arguably less-than-desirable, implications for society. First, the introduction of additional financial
competition among schools will likely further degrade the industry’s
existing level of competitive balance on the playing field.157 Second,
at least some schools are likely to cover any resulting new cost
overruns, at least in part, through greater reallocations of their
general operating budgets—costs that will, in many instances,
ultimately be passed on to the institutions’ general student
populations in the forms of higher tuition and/or student fees.158 And
finally, these new costs can be expected to lead to a further reduction in nonrevenue sports, which will present challenges to the
155. See Dionne L. Koller, A Twenty-First-Century Olympic and Amateur Sports Act, 20
VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 1027, 1039 (2018) (“[M]any Olympic athletes are drawn from
intercollegiate sports.” (citing Student-Athletes at the 2018 Winter Olympics, NCAA (Feb. 6,
2018, 8:48 AM), https://www.ncaa.org/sports/2018/2/6/student-athletes-at-the-2018-winterolympics.aspx [https://perma.cc/PW5L-Z23J])); Dionne L. Koller, How the Expressive Power
of Title IX Dilutes Its Promise, 3 HARV. J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 103, 133 (2012) (“[M]embers of
Congress and sports leaders [have] express[ed] the sentiment that educational institutions
have an important role to play in training Olympic athletes.”).
156. Mitten & Ross, supra note 34, at 854.
157. See supra notes 142-45 and accompanying text.
158. See supra notes 146-53 and accompanying text.
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nation’s existing Olympic training model as well as efforts to expand
educational opportunity via intercollegiate athletics.159
Of course, one could reasonably dispute whether any of these
countervailing policy ramifications outweigh the gains that salary
competition in the college sports industry would provide to those
student-athletes economically exploited by the current system.
Indeed, striking a socially optimal balance between the various
implications of a pay-for-play model for the college sports industry
is an especially difficult task, one that may regrettably be beyond
the reach of the judiciary, given the current contours of the law.160
As a result, then, this would appear to be an area ripe for legislative
intervention and reform.161
IV. THE CASE FOR A CONDITIONAL ANTITRUST EXEMPTION FOR THE
NCAA
Although the foregoing analysis has highlighted the need for
legislative reform of intercollegiate athletics, there is considerable
reason to doubt whether Congress will come to the NCAA’s aid in
the aftermath of the Supreme Court’s decision in Alston. As sports
columnist Andy Staples has noted, “one of the few things Republicans and Democrats can agree on is their hatred of the NCAA.”162
Indeed, the current system’s perceived exploitation of studentathletes—many of whom are students of color coming from underprivileged backgrounds—would seemingly resonate with those on
both the political left (from a social-justice perspective) and right (by
distorting both the right to contract and free-market capitalism).163
159. See supra notes 152-53, 155-56 and accompanying text.
160. Cf. Mitten & Ross, supra note 34, at 861 (explaining why courts applying antitrust law
cannot “meaningfully deal with ways in which non-commercial firms may act contrary to the
public interest”).
161. See O’Bannon v. NCAA, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 1008-09 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (“[P]erceived
inequities in college athletics and higher education generally, could be better addressed as a
policy matter.”), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 802 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2015)); see also Meyer
& Zimbalist, supra note 46, at 51-52.
162. Andy Staples, Why the NCAA Is Taking a Massive Step Just by Discussing Athletes’
Path to Profit, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (May 14, 2019), https://www.si.com/college/2019/05/14/
ncaa-working-group-schools-compensation-options-for-athletes [https://perma.cc/C765-TWJ9].
163. Compare Erin E. Buzuvis, Athletic Compensation for Women Too? Title IX
Implications of Northwestern and O’Bannon, 41 J. COLL. & U.L. 297, 307 (2015) (“These arguments take on a race and class dimension as well, since the NCAA’s amateurism policy is
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Nevertheless, recent public opinion polling data suggests that a
substantial portion of the American public would oppose the introduction of unfettered “pay-for-play” to the college sports industry.
Although approximately half of all Americans now support allowing
student-athletes to receive greater compensation, 60 percent nevertheless “believe compensation or sponsorships should be capped to
protect the amateur nature of college sports.”164
Meanwhile, the foregoing analysis has also established that there
are significant reasons to doubt whether NCAA schools could
successfully adjust to free-market competition for the services of
their players in an economically efficient or sustainable manner.165
Even two of the NCAA’s harshest judicial critics—Justice Kavanaugh and Judge Wilken—have both suggested that this is an
area in which federal legislation could be warranted.166 So although
the NCAA appears to be heading down the path advocated by some
commentators and college sports administrators who believe that
the optimal social policy would be to give universities greater
leeway to determine the applicable rules at their respective
conference level—thereby forcing these conferences to compete in
the marketplace for the services of players and attention of
particularly harmful to athletes who are recruited out of poverty and who, owing to systemic
discrimination, have lacked access to educational resources prior to attending college.” (first
citing Amy Christian McCormick & Robert A. McCormick, Race and Interest Convergence in
NCAA Sports, 2 WAKE FOREST J.L. & POL’Y 17, 24-25 (2012); then citing Erin E. Buzuvis, Title
IX Feminism, Social Justice, and NCAA Reform, 5 FREEDOM CTR. J. 101, 112-14 (2014); then
citing Taylor Branch, The Shame of College Sports, ATL. MONTHLY, Oct. 2011, at 80, 83,
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2011/10/the-shame-of-college-sports/308643/;
and then citing BILLY HAWKINS, THE NEW PLANTATION: BLACK ATHLETES, COLLEGE SPORTS,
AND PREDOMINANTLY WHITE NCAA INSTITUTIONS 14-15 (2010))), with David French, Championship Monday, Brought to You by the Oppressive Progressives at the NCAA, NAT’L REV.
(Apr. 4, 2016, 6:39 PM), https://www.nationalreview.com/2016/04/ncaa-student-athletes-ex
ploitation-conservative-issue/ [https://perma.cc/JF55-VQSQ] (stating the conservative case for
NCAA reform).
164. 50 Percent of Americans Support Compensation for College Athletes, TIPP ONLINE
(Jan. 14, 2021), https://www.tipponline.com/article/50-percent-of-americans-support-compensation-for-college-athletes [https://perma.cc/GQ37-BU7C].
165. See supra Parts III.A & III.B.
166. NCAA v. Alston, 141 S. Ct. 2141, 2168 (2021) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (acknowledging the “difficult questions” that could arise from full-throated competition for the services
of NCAA student-athletes, and suggesting that “[l]egislation would be one option” to resolve
these matters); O’Bannon v. NCAA, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 1008-09 (“[P]erceived inequities in college
athletics and higher education generally, could be better addressed as a policy matter.... Such
reforms and remedies could be undertaken by ... Congress.”).
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fans167—there are compelling reasons to doubt whether such a
restructuring will, on the whole, prove as effective as these reformers believe. Thus, this Article contends that Congress should
intervene by granting the NCAA a conditional antitrust exemption
and proposes two alternative paths such legislation could follow.
A. The Theoretical Basis for an NCAA Antitrust Exemption
To begin, there is little doubt that Congress possesses the power
to legislatively reform intercollegiate athletics.168 Both the college
sports industry and higher education more generally are already (in
some cases, highly) regulated by the federal government.169 Indeed,
Congress’s decision to eschew free-market principles by requiring
colleges and universities to provide equal athletic opportunity to
women via the historic Title IX legislation has—despite its many
beneficial aspects—helped contribute to the budgetary pressures
currently afflicting most major college sports programs.170
And although U.S. antitrust law and policy are generally premised on the belief that “competition is the best method of allocating
resources” across the nation’s economy,171 commentators have
identified three situations that may nevertheless warrant the
creation of some form of antitrust exemption: (1) natural monopoly,
(2) market failure, and (3) the subsidization of certain socially
167. See generally Marc Edelman, A Short Treatise on Amateurism and Antitrust Law: Why
the NCAA’s No-Pay Rules Violate Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 64 CASE W. RSRV. L. REV. 61,
97 (2013) (advocating for conference-level governance); Kreher, supra note 17, at 81-86
(advocating for the same).
168. See, e.g., Mitten & Ross, supra note 34, at 868 (contending that Congress “ha[s] the
power to exempt specific private economic conduct from the federal antitrust laws” in order
“to protect public welfare”).
169. See Meyer & Zimbalist, supra note 46, at 58 n.147 (observing that “regulating college
athletics including eligibility, scholarships, scheduling, and spending is not so different from
regulating college financial assistance such as covered in the Higher Education Act” or
“gender equality in college sports” under Title IX).
170. Cf. Jennifer R. Capasso, Note, Structure Versus Effect: Revealing the Unconstitutional
Operation of Title IX’s Athletics Provisions, 46 B.C. L. REV. 825, 841 (2005) (“[Recent] trend[s]
in case law and Title IX interpretation, coupled with the intense pressures to reduce athletic
budgets, ha[ve] caused institutions to resort to cutting only men’s teams in order to remain
compliant with Title IX.” (first citing Mia. Univ. Wrestling Club v. Mia. Univ., 302 F.3d 608,
611 (6th Cir. 2002); then citing Boulahanis v. Bd. of Regents, 198 F.3d 633, 635 (7th Cir.
1999); and then citing Kelley v. Bd. of Trs., 35 F.3d 265, 269 (7th Cir. 1994))).
171. Nat’l Soc’y of Pro. Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 695 (1978).
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desired activities.172 Arguably, all three bases help support the creation of a limited, conditional antitrust exemption for the NCAA
today.
1. Natural Monopoly
A natural monopoly has been classically defined as an industry
in which “the entire demand within a relevant market can be
satisfied at lowest cost by one firm rather than by two or more.”173
Although the NCAA may not, strictly speaking, meet this prototypical definition, a variety of economists and legal commentators
have noted over the years that sports leagues nevertheless exhibit
similar characteristics to natural monopolies in at least some
respects.174 Indeed, history has shown that the existence of multiple
competing professional leagues in a single sport has proven unsustainable, insofar as the public “prefer[s] to watch the best players
compete” with one another in competition that ultimately culminates in a single, unified championship team being crowned.175
The intercollegiate athletics industry exhibits similar preferences
and pressures, with the history of the sport of college football
serving as an illustrative example. Because the NCAA has never
organized a national championship tournament for the upper tier of
Division I football-sponsoring institutions, the major college football
postseason has always been structured around a series of year-end
bowl games pitting two schools’ teams against one another in

172. See A.B.A. SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, FEDERAL STATUTORY EXEMPTIONS FROM
ANTITRUST LAW 53 (2007); see also Lazaroff, supra note 70, at 241 (citing ABA’s 2007
monograph).
173. Richard A. Posner, Natural Monopoly and Its Regulation, 21 STAN. L. REV. 548, 548
(1969).
174. See PAUL C. WEILER, LEVELING THE PLAYING FIELD: HOW THE LAW CAN MAKE SPORTS
BETTER FOR FANS 330 (2000) (noting “the arguably natural monopoly status of any major
league sport”); Walter C. Neale, The Peculiar Economics of Professional Sports, 78 Q.J. ECON.
1, 4 (1964) (stating that from an economics perspective, “the theoretical conclusion is clear:
each professional sport is a natural monopoly”); Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., A Proposal for the
Antitrust Regulation of Professional Sports, 79 B.U. L. REV. 889, 899 (1999) (“[L]eagues should
be viewed as ‘natural monopolies’ which have gained their market dominance by establishing
the most efficient means of delivering their products to consumers.”).
175. Nathaniel Grow, Regulating Professional Sports Leagues, 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
573, 634 (2015) (discussing historical examples).
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matchups held in various tourist-friendly destinations.176 Up until
the 1990s, no mechanism existed to ensure that the top two teams
in the country were paired against one another in a season-ending
bowl game, meaning that on a number of occasions, two or more
teams could credibly stake some claim to that year’s “national
championship.”177 Eventually, public outcry over such an unsatisfactory conclusion to the season grew to a crescendo, resulting in the
formation of various mechanisms—first the two-team Bowl Championship Series (BCS) national championship game, and presently
the four-team College Football Playoff (CFP)—to ensure that the
nation’s best teams would face off at the end of each season,
allowing an undisputed national champion to be crowned.178
In order for such a season-ending championship to be staged—
whether in football, basketball, or any other NCAA sport—some
meaningful level of coordination between the participating universities (or their conferences) is necessary. At a bare minimum, this
requires the competing schools to agree on a time and place to play
the championship game as well as a common set of playing rules to
govern the competition. Similarly, some selection criteria must be
agreed upon and applied in order to identify the teams that will
compete.
To be sure, many of these basic agreements would undoubtedly
be upheld as lawful under full antitrust scrutiny insofar as they are
necessary to produce a beneficial joint product amongst competing
schools.179 But to the extent that the industry determines that it
needs to go further to ensure that teams are competing on a
176. Cf. Dylan Williams & Chad Seifried, The Taxing Postseason: The Potential Impact of
Unrelated Business Income Taxation on College Football Bowl Organizers, 23 J. LEGAL
ASPECTS SPORT 72, 72 (2013) (“[B]owl games are postseason contests created to reward those
institutions that completed a successful regular season in the Division I FBS.”).
177. See Joy Blanchard, Flag on the Play: A Review of Antitrust Challenges to the NCAA.
Could the New College Football Playoff Be Next?, 15 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 24 (2015)
(“From 1946 to 1991, the top two collegiate football teams in the country played one another
at the end of the season a mere nine times.” (citing Eric Thieme, Note, You Can’t Win ‘Em All:
How the NCAA’s Dominance of the College Basketball Postseason Reveals There Will Never Be
an NCAA Football Playoff, 40 IND. L. REV. 453, 459 (2007))).
178. See id. at 25-32 (recounting history).
179. Cf. Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 560 U.S. 183, 202 (2010) (“The fact that
NFL teams share an interest in making the entire league successful and profitable, and that
they must cooperate in the production and scheduling of games, provides a perfectly sensible
justification for making a host of collective decisions.”).
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relatively equal playing field in order to guarantee that the resulting competition is as compelling as possible for the viewing
public, then, following Alston, some level of antitrust protection will
likely prove necessary. Indeed, U.S. professional sports leagues
have long recognized that some sort of spending controls are needed
in order to maintain a sufficient level of competitive balance between their teams.180 Because major college football has historically
lacked any such overall spending limits, many believe that the sport
is already suffering from a lack of competitive balance.181 In the CFP
era, just four universities—Alabama, Clemson, Ohio State, and
Oklahoma—have dominated the competition, filling seventeen of
the total twenty-four playoff slots available during the first six years
of the current system’s existence.182 The introduction of additional
financial competition between schools for the services of their
players following Alston is only likely to further this trend. Thus, in
addition to the basic agreements relating to the time and place of
any championship competition, some level of spending controls may
well also prove necessary in a post-Alston world in order to provide
the most compelling competition possible and prevent a small
handful of universities from consistently dominating the field.
Therefore, although the college sports industry may not meet the
traditional definition of a natural monopoly, it nevertheless exhibits
some similar characteristics. No single university—or small group
of schools—acting alone can provide the season-ending, national
championship competition demanded by the market. But to make

180. Cf. Nathaniel Grow, Free Agency for the Front Office: How Data Analytics and
Noncompete Agreements Threaten to Disrupt Competitive Balance in U.S. Professional Sports
Leagues, 58 AM. BUS. L.J. 121, 122 (2021) (“U.S. professional sports leagues have traditionally
attempted to maintain a sufficient level of competitive balance amongst their franchises by
implementing measures intended to help equalize the level of playing talent spread across the
league’s teams (including measures such as salary caps and player drafts).”).
181. See, e.g., Austin Pert, Is a Lack of College Football Parity Hurting Television Ratings?,
BUS. COLL. SPORTS (Jan. 20, 2021), https://businessofcollegesports.com/television/is-a-lack-ofcollege-football-parity-hurting-television-ratings/ [https://perma.cc/L3PR-9Y2J] (analyzing
data suggesting the same).
Indeed, such success is likely to form a self-perpetuating cycle, in which a team is able to
reinvest the additional revenues generated during its championship-winning season to further
improve its program, thereby further separating it from much of the rest of the competition.
182. See Chuck Culpepper, The College Football Playoff Has Become an Exclusive Club.
West Coast Schools Not Invited, WASH. POST (Dec. 18, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
sports/2020/12/18/cfp-alabama-clemson-ohio-state/ [https://perma.cc/72Y7-TUH8].
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such competition as consistently entertaining and compelling as
possible, schools will likely need to coordinate in ways that, following Alston, may run afoul of antitrust law.
2. Market Failure
Meanwhile, a second context that has been found to justify a
statutory exemption from antitrust law in some cases is when an
industry exhibits some form of market failure.183 Generally speaking, market failure “occurs when some characteristic of the market
itself prevents competition from working properly,”184 such as by
failing to “sustain ‘desirable’ activities or to estop ‘undesirable’
activities.”185 One such potential form of market failure is an industry exhibiting characteristics of “ruinous competition,”186 in
which vigorous competition between firms will all but inevitably
prove so unprofitable that it will drive the competitors out of
business.187
The theory of “ruinous competition” has generally fallen out of
favor in antitrust circles,188 and, in any event, is not strictly applicable to intercollegiate athletics (insofar as spending on sports is
unlikely to be the sole factor causing an institution of higher
education to go out of business). Still, one can argue that the college
183. See A.B.A. SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 172, at 53.
184. Herbert Hovenkamp, Technology, Politics, and Regulated Monopoly: An American
Historical Perspective, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1263, 1266 (1984).
185. Francis M. Bator, The Anatomy of Market Failure, 72 Q.J. ECON. 351, 351 (1958).
186. See Peter Hettich, YouTube to Be Regulated? The FCC Sits Tight, While European
Broadcast Regulators Make the Grab for the Internet, 82 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1447, 1497 (2008)
(observing that “ruinous competition” could constitute a form of market failure); Lazaroff,
supra note 70, at 241 (explaining that “[m]arket ... failures can deal with ... destructive or
ruinous competition” (citing A.B.A. SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, FEDERAL STATUTORY
EXEMPTIONS FROM ANTITRUST LAW 56-81 (2007))).
187. See Marc P. Schwartz, Note, Start-Up Sports Leagues: Why These Leagues Are Entitled
to Use the Ruinous Competition Defense to Justify Anticompetitive Restraints, 12 FORDHAM
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 647, 649 n.12 (2002) (“The term ‘ruinous competition’ refers
to industry competitors competing so vigorously that they ultimately drive each other out of
business.” (citing Herbert Hovenkamp, The Antitrust Movement and the Rise of Industrial
Organization, 68 TEX. L. REV. 105, 123 (1989))).
188. See Herbert Hovenkamp, United States Competition Policy in Crisis: 1890-1955, 94
MINN. L. REV. 311, 330 (2009) (“By the 1920s, however, a consensus began to emerge that very
high-scale economies producing truly ruinous competition probably existed in only a few
industries.”).
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sports industry is nevertheless engaged in an analogous form of
highly inefficient, even if not ultimately “ruinous,” competition. As
discussed above, intercollegiate athletics exhibits an atypical market structure, in which nonprofit organizations are engaged in
fierce, zero-sum competition on the playing field, while simultaneously completing substantial commercial transactions off the
field.189 And because the economic rewards that result from
triumphing in this sporting competition can be so considerable,190
universities have continued to invest heavily in intercollegiate
athletics, to the point that most schools lose millions of dollars per
year on their sports programs.191 Nor are such expenditures necessarily irrational from a behavioral economics perspective as the lack
of accountability to shareholder interests in these nonprofit
organizations motivates college athletics administrators to devote
every possible resource to the goal of winning as many championships as possible.192
Consequently, the unique industrial organization of U.S.
intercollegiate athletics—and the unusual economic incentives that
result—suggest that the industry is inherently drawn towards an
inefficient form of competition. Specifically, it appears inevitable
that a large number of schools will be willing to absorb significant—and, arguably, socially undesirable—financial losses in order
to avoid falling further behind the handful of their peers that have
been able to translate historic success on the playing field into a
consistent (if narrow) margin of profit.193 The college sports industry
therefore exhibits signs of what is, effectively, a form of market
failure, one in which otherwise rational incentives are driving
schools to spend socially undesirable amounts of money on an
endeavor ancillary to their general educational mission.
189. See supra Part III.A.
190. Mitten, supra note 52, at 2 (“The significant economic rewards of winning [on the
playing field] have generated fierce off-field competition among universities.”).
191. See supra note 34 and accompanying text; Zimbalist, supra note 35 (reporting that
from 2017 to 2018, the median operating loss for a Division I FBS university was $16.3
million).
192. See Blue, supra note 23 (“From a behavioral economics perspective, financial decisionmaking in college sports has been perfectly rational within the structures of the current
system. Aggressively reinvesting available revenue back into the competitive mission is
sensible behavior that is aligned with the local interests of each school and its leadership.”).
193. See supra Part I.
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Unfortunately, any attempt to regulate spending levels across
NCAA institutions under the existing legal precedent would, as
explained above, presumably run afoul of the Sherman Act.194
Therefore, to the extent that Congress ultimately determines that
this level of spending on college athletics is wasteful, some form of
legislative intervention is necessary.195
3. Socially Desired Activity
Finally, Congress has, at times, also granted antitrust immunity
in order to protect various forms of “socially desired activity,”196
including several exemptions protecting what were perceived to be
socially beneficial arrangements in both the higher education and
sports industries.197 Depending on one’s point of view, similar
socially desirable activity is potentially at risk post-Alston, should
a future court eventually strike down the NCAA’s student-athlete
compensation restrictions in their entirety as an illegal restraint of
trade. Specifically, as discussed above, after Alston, it only appears
to be a matter of time until NCAA member institutions will—
whether voluntarily or by court order—adopt an unregulated, freemarket system of athlete compensation.198 Should that occur, then
one can—as laid out above—reasonably anticipate that schools will
194. See supra notes 97-98 and accompanying text (discussing the applicability of the
Sherman Act to the NCAA generally); see also Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010, 1022-23 (10th
Cir. 1998) (holding that an NCAA restriction on college basketball coaches’ salaries
constituted an illegal restraint of trade).
195. Cf. Jordan Weissmann, The Real Crisis in College Sports: It’s Wasted Money, Not
Wasted Students, THE ATLANTIC (Jan. 24, 2012), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/ar
chive/2012/01/the-real-crisis-in-college-sports-its-wasted-money-not-wasted-students/251922/
[https://perma.cc/ECG7-7BDE] (characterizing the college sports industry’s current spending
habits as “waste[ful]”).
196. Lazaroff, supra note 70, at 241 (citing A.B.A. SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, FEDERAL
STATUTORY EXEMPTIONS FROM ANTITRUST LAW (2007)).
197. For instance, the Need-Based Educational Aid Act of 2008 permits colleges and
universities to share student financial aid information, and a separate antitrust exemption
was enacted in 2004 to protect the medical school residency matching program. See
Blanchard, supra note 177, at 37 (discussing examples). Meanwhile, the sports industry has
also received various antitrust exemptions from Congress over the years, including most
notably the Sports Broadcasting Act of 1961—to facilitate the negotiation of league-wide
television broadcast agreements—and the 1966 exemption formally permitting the National
Football League (NFL) and American Football League to merge. See id.
198. See supra Part III.B.
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either increase tuition or student fees to cover the resulting increase
in costs, and/or begin to eliminate various nonrevenue sports in
order to help alleviate any resulting budgetary pressures.199 Such
responses would either further compound the existing college tuition
and student loan crisis or decrease the available opportunities for
talented individuals to use their athletic abilities to offset the cost
of higher education200 while also potentially hampering the nation’s
existing model of training Olympic athletes.201
At the same time, some would argue that one additional—albeit
more controversial—societal interest is also at stake: the tradition
of amateur intercollegiate athletics.202 To the extent that Congress
believes that the existing “amateur” model of college athletics is—at
least to some extent—socially desirable, then that preference would
also militate in favor of granting the NCAA an antitrust exemption,
in order to ensure that the industry can lawfully impose some
reasonable spending restraints on its members.
To reiterate, reasonable minds can certainly disagree as to the
extent to which any of the aforementioned societal concerns warrant
immunizing the NCAA from the Sherman Act.203 But if Congress
wishes to avoid risking any of the potentially adverse implications
identified above, then it would appear that some form of antitrust
exemption is necessary.

199. See supra notes 152-53 and accompanying text (discussing the history of NCAA
schools cutting nonrevenue sports).
200. See McDavis, supra note 39, at 340 (arguing that pay for play would have the result
that “[s]ports will be cut and access to higher education will be restricted for many”).
201. See supra notes 155-56 and accompanying text (outlining the likely implications of a
cut to nonrevenue sports).
202. See Adam R. Schaefer, Recent Development, Slam Dunk: The Case for an NCAA
Antitrust Exemption, 83 N.C. L. REV. 555, 567 (2005) (suggesting that the NCAA needs an
antitrust exemption in order to play its “critical role in the maintenance of a revered tradition
of amateurism in college sports” (quoting NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S.
85, 120 (1984))).
203. See Marc Edelman, The District Court Decision in O’Bannon v. National Collegiate
Athletic Association: A Small Step Forward for College-Athlete Rights, and a Gateway for Far
Grander Change, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2319, 2361 (2014) (contending that it “would be
misguided for Congress” to grant the NCAA an antitrust exemption).
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B. Two Alternate Proposals for NCAA Reform
Should Congress ultimately determine that a statutory antitrust
exemption for the U.S. intercollegiate athletics industry is warranted, then it will be forced to resolve a series of difficult policy
questions. Chief among these questions would be just how broadly
the NCAA ought to be safeguarded, including—perhaps most importantly—what sort of student-athlete compensation model would best
serve the public interest. Moreover, Congress would also have to
consider what conditions, if any, ought to be placed on the college
sports industry in return for this legal protection.
This Article contends that any antitrust immunity for the NCAA
ought to be both (1) limited and (2) conditional. Specifically,
granting a blanket antitrust exemption for the NCAA and its
member institutions would be unwise as it would enable the
association to implement socially undesirable, anticompetitive
practices in any of its areas of operation (for example, the television
broadcasting restrictions that the Supreme Court struck down in
the Board of Regents case).204 At the same time, any antitrust
immunity for the NCAA and its members also ought to be conditioned on the industry implementing certain pro-athlete reforms.
Indeed, considering the industry’s widely perceived lackluster
history of protecting the rights of student-athletes, most observers
would agree that granting the NCAA an antitrust exemption
without conditions would be unwise.205
This Part considers these issues by first setting forth what ought
to be the minimum conditions upon which any NCAA antitrust
exemption is premised, before sketching out two alternative paths
by which Congress could reform the college sports industry via a
limited antitrust exemption.

204. See 468 U.S. 85, 86 (1984).
205. See Lazaroff, supra note 70, at 247-48 (“[G]ranting a blanket antitrust exemption to
the NCAA, without the farmer watching the henhouse, would be the equivalent of leaving the
fox free to devour its prey.”); Meyer & Zimbalist, supra note 46, at 57-58 (setting forth
substantive conditions for an NCAA antitrust exemption); Mitten & Ross, supra note 34, at
869 (contending that an “independent commission overseeing big-time intercollegiate athletics” ought to be created in exchange for any limited antitrust immunity).
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1. Conditional Antitrust Immunity
This Article is not the first to propose a potential antitrust exemption for the NCAA, nor is it the first to suggest that any such
legislative measure be conditioned on the association implementing
some set of reforms. Indeed, scholars have identified a number of
such potential stipulations over the years for Congress to consider.206 However, this Article asserts that, at a minimum, any
antitrust exemption should be premised on the following four
reforms.
First, any antitrust immunity should be conditioned on the NCAA
revising its governance framework to provide meaningful representation of current student-athletes (at both the university and
national-office level). Although the NCAA does currently convene a
series of “Student-Athlete Advisory Committee” meetings for
purposes of soliciting athlete “input on” the “rules, regulations and
policies that affect” their lives on campus, the committee is,
ultimately, just advisory; the association remains free to implement
or discard this input however it sees fit.207 Instead, the NCAA has
historically largely vested its actual rulemaking authority in two
key bodies: the Division I Council and Division I Board of Directors.208 Although both of these groups have token student-athlete
representation—two of the forty members of the Division I Council
are student-athletes, whereas one student-athlete is included among
the twenty-four members of the Division I Board of Directors209—this representation is ultimately proportionally insufficient
to ensure that student-athletes have a meaningful voice in the
formulation of the rules and regulations that will shape their college
experience.
206. See, e.g., Meyer & Zimbalist, supra note 46, at 57-58 (suggesting, inter alia, that
Congress include requirements, such as mandatory injury insurance for its athletes and an
NCAA-sponsored national tournament for FBS football schools, in exchange for antitrust
immunity); Mitten & Ross, supra note 34, at 869-70 (advocating for antitrust immunity
conditioned on certain requirements); Mitten et al., supra note 42, at 838-41 (same based on
the adoption of various pro-education reforms by the NCAA).
207. See, e.g., History of the Division II National SAAC, NCAA, https://www.ncaa.org/
sports/2013/11/16/history-of-the-division-ii-national-saac.aspx [https://perma.cc/8EUV-RC45].
208. See Nathaniel Grow & Todd Haugh, Assessing the NCAA as a Compliance Organization, 2021 WIS. L. REV. 787, 796-802 (2021) (summarizing the NCAA’s rulemaking
process).
209. See id. at 797.
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As historian Taylor Branch has noted, it was not until Congress
passed the Olympic and Amateur Sports Act of 1978, giving U.S.
Olympic athletes 20 percent of the voting power in the various
organizations that govern the country’s thirty-nine Olympic sports,
that these organizations began to meaningfully consider the rights
of the athletes subject to their regulations.210 Congress should insist
that the NCAA implement a similar reform in exchange for any
immunity from antitrust liability, thereby granting current studentathletes a much greater stake in formulating the policies that
govern their sports (and lives).211 This reform would, in turn, hopefully lead to the industry adopting sensible reforms in a variety of
areas, including the aforementioned concerns over student-athletes’
educational and medical treatment.212
Second, any congressional action should also ensure that
student-athletes are allowed to preserve the right to monetize their
NIL, as is currently the case after the NCAA elected not to regulate
the space in the summer of 2021.213 Not only is the ability to control
the use of your name, image, and likeness arguably a basic right
but it also helps to decrease the exploitation of student-athletes
under the current system, giving them access to a potentially lucrative source of revenue during their college careers.214
210. See Taylor Branch, Testimony of Taylor Branch United States Senate Committee on
Commerce, Science, and Transportation, TAYLORBRANCH.COM (July 9, 2014), https://taylor
branch.com/2014/07/09/testimony-of-taylor-branch-united-states-senate-committee-oncommerce-science-and-transportation/ [https://perma.cc/GM58-WEWK] (“One key provision
of [the Olympic and Amateur Sports Act of 1978] secured for active athletes a twenty-percent
share of the voting seats on each of the thirty-nine new U.S. Olympic Committees. Though
small, this representation soon transformed amateur sports.”).
211. At the same time, should it see fit, Congress could also require the NCAA to increase
the representation of truly independent voices in its managerial structure. For instance, some
have asserted that the NCAA should have a meaningful number of independent members on
its board of directors to ensure that “the good of all athletes, rather than the commercial interests of a limited number of the wealthiest athletic programs,” drives organizational policy.
Lopiano, supra note 54, at 271-72.
212. See supra notes 60-66 and accompanying text.
213. If deemed necessary, Congress could authorize some limited restrictions on players’
NIL rights, such as a rule preventing players from associating with socially undesirable
businesses (such as providers of adult-themed entertainment, et cetera). However, any such
rules should be as narrowly tailored as possible, not only to preserve the rights of studentathletes but also to foster ease of administrability. See Grow & Haugh, supra note 208, at 846
(asserting that streamlined regulations will ultimately enhance the legitimacy of the NCAA
and its bylaws).
214. Indeed, initial reports suggest that some student-athletes quickly signed NIL
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Third, although not directly targeted at the NCAA, Congress
would also be wise to include a provision in any NCAA reform
legislation outlawing age-based restrictions that prevent college
athletes from entering their respective professional sport’s annual
draft.215 Much of the perceived exploitation of highly skilled college
football and men’s basketball players arguably stems from the fact
that these individuals must wait a period of one or more years after
their high school graduation to be eligible to be drafted by an NFL
or National Basketball Association (NBA) team.216 As a result, for
years the NFL and NBA have essentially been free-riding off of U.S.
endorsement deals totaling upwards of $600,000 in just the first few weeks that such
agreements were allowed. See JohnWallStreet, College NIL Market’s Top End Is Likely $600K
Despite Saban Claim, SPORTICO (July 26, 2021, 5:55 AM), https://www.sportico.com/leagues/
college-sports/2021/nil-market-compensation-1234635276/ [https://perma.cc/X9MG-5W4K].
215. Such a policy recommendation is supported by a considerable body of academic
literature outside the context of a NCAA antitrust exemption. See, e.g., Marc Edelman & C.
Keith Harrison, Analyzing the WNBA’s Mandatory Age/Education Policy from a Legal,
Cultural, and Ethical Perspective: Women, Men, and the Professional Sports Landscape, 3 NW.
J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 1, 2 (2008); Zubin Kottoor, Note, One-and-Done Is No Fun: The NBA Draft
Eligibility Rule’s Conundrum and a Proposed Solution, 8 ARIZ. ST. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 98, 101
(2018); Michael A. McCann, Illegal Defense: The Irrational Economics of Banning High School
Players from the NBA Draft, 3 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 113, 115 (2004); Brian Shaffer,
Comment, The NBA’s Age Requirement Shoots and Misses: How the Non-Statutory Exemption
Produces Inequitable Results for High School Basketball Stars, 48 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 681,
683 (2008).
216. See Charles Barrowman III, Can Congress Play Ball?: Congressional Power to Implement and Enforce Pay-for-Play Among Student-Athletes, 18 U. DENV. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 111,
130-31 (2015) (“A college football or men’s college basketball player must wait until three
years or one year, respectively, before they may enter a professional league’s draft.” (citing
Ben Kercheval, If the NCAA Allowed It, NFL Shouldn’t Hesitate to Help Fund Cost of
Scholarship, BLEACHER REP. (Apr. 10, 2014), https://bleacherreport.com/articles/2024136-ifncaa-allowed-it-nfl-shouldnt-hesitate-to-help-fund-cost-of-scholarship)). That being said, in
recent years the NBA has allowed players to enter its developmental G League straight out
of high school, although those players must still wait one year before being drafted. See Uriah
Tagle, Delay of Game: Analyzing the Legality of the NBA and WNBA Eligibility Rules and
Their Effects on Top Amateur Basketball Players, 21 U. DENV. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 159, 167
(2018) (“[T]he only options available for eighteen-year-old prospects under the current
eligibility rules are to: (1) play NCAA basketball for at least one year; (2) play professionally
overseas for at least one year; or (3) play professionally in the G-League, the NBA’s developmental league, for at least one year.” (footnote omitted)); see also Gould, supra note 5, at 162
(describing the “symbiotic relationship between the universities and the professional leagues
for which they serve as minor league preparatory bodies, which has helped to fuel discord”);
Sanderson & Siegfried, supra note 28, at 196-97 (finding that the NFL and NBA drafteligibility rules serve to “reduc[e] the paid alternatives that are available to talented young
players” thereby “drastically reduc[ing] the viable paid options that are available” to these
players, effectively forcing them “to attend a big-time university sports program”).
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colleges and universities, letting these schools shoulder the cost of
training their future talent pools.217 Were college athletes instead
able to be drafted whenever their abilities warranted, elite players
would no longer be forced to risk a career-threatening injury for
below-market wages while spending the requisite time in college.
Along with the preservation of NIL rights discussed above, this
tweak would substantially reduce the perceived exploitation of these
athletes under the current system.
Finally, in addition to the student-athlete-right-enhancing
recommendations above, Congress should also require that the
NCAA impose reasonable spending controls on the NCAA’s constituents in exchange for any antitrust immunity, thereby helping to
curb the current incentives driving the runaway college sports
“arms race.”218 Left to their own devices, self-governing organizations such as the NCAA typically struggle to decrease wasteful
expenditures amongst their membership.219 Along these lines,
commentators have been advocating for years for the college sports
industry to implement various forms of spending limits.220 Meanwhile, others have asserted that Congress should require that all
university athletic departments be self-supporting financially.221
Regardless of the precise contours, Congress should require the
NCAA to implement some set of reasonable spending restrictions in
exchange for any antitrust relief.222 The present (arguably
217. See Mitten, supra note 52, at 2 (“[U]niversities sponsoring ‘big-time’ football and
basketball programs effectively serve as a farm system for the [NFL] and [NBA] by providing
the training environment and playing field for talented football and basketball players to hone
their physical talents.”).
218. See supra Part I (discussing the unusual economic incentives that result from the
college sports industry’s use of nonprofit organizations to run intercollegiate athletics
departments).
219. See Mitten & Ross, supra note 34, at 858 (“Self-governing organizations also struggle
to solve problems relating to wasteful expenditures.”).
220. See Lazaroff, supra note 70, at 237 (citing a proposal by the Women’s Sports
Foundation that would have granted the NCAA “a limited antitrust exemption to restrain
spending growth in the areas of coaches’ salaries and recruiting in men’s football and
basketball”); Meyer & Zimbalist, supra note 46, at 56 (“[W]e propose a cap on spending to
build new facilities that would be exempt from the antitrust laws.”).
221. See Mitten & Ross, supra note 34, at 874 (proposing a requirement that “each Division
I university’s intercollegiate athletics department ... be financially self-sufficient”).
222. See Meyer & Zimbalist, supra note 46, at 54 (contending that the NCAA should be
allowed to “control the cost of athletics ... so the support of athletics programs does not
damage the ability of the institution to support its primary academic programs”).
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undesirable) level of spending among athletic departments is largely
driven by otherwise rational economic incentives that operate
beyond the control of a single school or conference.223 Not only is
such widespread and sustained deficit spending arguably wasteful
but it has also created a potentially existential threat for the
industry, with university athletic departments largely ill-equipped
to handle any sudden decline in revenue.224 Requiring the NCAA to
impose reasonable spending limits on its members would help
diffuse this potential danger while also restricting athletics
spending to more socially desirable levels.225 Any surplus revenues
could then be directed to the university’s general educational
mission.
In exchange for agreeing to implement the recommended reforms
above, Congress would grant the NCAA the legal right to limit its
members’ athletics-related spending. This would, in turn, allow
NCAA schools to agree to regulate their compensation of studentathletes and coaches—along with other related spending—without
fear of antitrust challenge. Such immunity would have two benefits.
First, it would allow the NCAA to avoid the potentially adverse
results of the Supreme Court’s decision in Alston.226 Second, by
reducing the extent to which the most commercially successful
schools can translate their financial advantages to sustained
dominance on the playing field, it would also likely improve the
existing levels of competitive balance across the industry, thereby
enhancing the appeal of college sports for the viewing public.
Depending on Congress’s policy preferences, these restrictions on
spending could take one of two forms with respect to student-athlete
compensation, each discussed in turn below: one roughly akin to the

223. See supra Part I (discussing the economic incentives of college athletic departments
operated as nonprofit organizations).
224. See Blue, supra note 23 (discussing the long-term risks to intercollegiate athletics
should revenue growth slow or reverse); Steve Berkowitz, NCAA Revenue for 2020 Down 50%
Due to Pandemic-Forced Cancellation of Basketball Tournament, USA TODAY (Jan. 25, 2021,
5:02 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/college/2021/01/25/ncaa-revenue-decreasedue-to-no-basketball-tournament/6699352002/ [https://perma.cc/JCQ6-LS4E] (reporting the
financial challenges to the NCAA that resulted from the COVID-19 pandemic and the forced
cancellation of the 2020 NCAA Men’s Basketball Tournament).
225. See supra note 218 and accompanying text.
226. See supra Part II.
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“Olympic” model, or another providing a limited “free-market”
approach.
2. The “Olympic” Model
One possible approach to student-athlete compensation, postAlston, would be to model college athletics on the system utilized by
the U.S. Olympic Committee. Such a system would expressly permit
U.S. colleges and universities to cap the compensation of their
student-athletes at no more than the full cost of their tuition, room,
board, and related educational expenses, but allow players to profit
from the use of their NIL. Currently, U.S. Olympic athletes receive
at most only nominal compensation from their Olympic governing
body in exchange for their athletic performance.227 In lieu of direct
compensation from their governing organizations, these athletes are
instead permitted to freely monetize their NIL rights, giving them
access to the potentially lucrative commercial endorsement marketplace.228
Implementing such an approach in the U.S. college sports
industry would thus effectively cement the NCAA’s new status quo
as of July 1, 2021, after the association announced that it would no
longer place any restrictions on student-athletes’ monetization of
their NIL.229 That having been said, the legislative sanctioning of
the Olympic model for the college sports industry is admittedly
unlikely to fully satisfy those who believe that the current system
significantly exploits high-profile athletes in the revenue sports of
men’s basketball and football by failing to provide these players
with a proportional share of the profits they generate for their
institutions.
227. See Meyer & Zimbalist, supra note 46, at 53 n.126 (“[T]he compensation of Olympic
athletes in the United States is determined by each sport’s federation and tends to be
nominal.”).
228. See Alex Moyer, Note, Throwing Out the Playbook: Replacing the NCAA’s
Anticompetitive Amateurism Regime with the Olympic Model, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 761, 825
(2015) (“Under the Olympic model, athletes have access to the commercial free market,
permitting athletes to secure endorsement deals or get paid for signing autographs, among
other things.” (citing RAMOGI HUMA & ELLEN J. STAUROWSKY, NAT’L COLL. PLAYERS ASS’N,
THE PRICE OF POVERTY IN BIG TIME COLLEGE SPORT 5 (2011), http://assets.usw.org/ncpa/ThePrice-of-Poverty-in-Big-Time-College-Sport.pdf)).
229. See supra notes 12-14 and accompanying text (explaining that the NCAA elected not
to regulate the NIL market).
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Nevertheless, there is reason to believe that the current status
quo may in fact provide the greatest benefit to the greatest number
of student-athletes. Specifically, under the existing model of intercollegiate athletics, schools spent roughly $116,000 per year on each
of their student-athletes in 2014.230 Although it is undoubtedly true
that universities would be willing to spend more than this to attract
certain star-level athletes,231 the overall number of such players is
likely to be relatively small.232 Indeed, in the first six months that
college athletes have been eligible to sign endorsement contracts,
the median Division I student-athlete only earned approximately six
dollars per month by licensing their NIL rights.233 Meanwhile, even
if one were to limit the analysis only to those players who actually
signed an NIL deal, the average player still only received approximately $250 per month in endorsement income in 2021.234 Therefore, for the vast majority of college athletes, the educational and
training benefits they receive under the current system are likely to
be more economically valuable than what they would generate in
salary on the open market.235 Preserving those widespread benefits
from disruption post-Alston would arguably be a worthwhile policy
objective for Congress to pursue.

230. See Meyer & Zimbalist, supra note 46, at 35 (reporting the average athletic spending
per student-athlete).
231. For instance, the recent FBI investigation into men’s college basketball alleged that
the athletics apparel manufacturer Adidas was willing to funnel $100,000 to entice a five-star
high school basketball prospect to play at the University of Louisville. See William W. Berry
III, The Crime of Amateurism, 61 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 219, 224 (2021) (discussing the FBI’s
college basketball investigation).
232. See Meyer & Zimbalist, supra note 46, at 53 (contending that “only the few biggest
star athletes on FBS football and male basketball teams are economically exploited”).
233. See Pat Eaton-Robb, Foreign College Athletes Left Out of Rush for NIL Windfall, U.S.
NEWS & WORLD REP. (Dec. 24, 2021, 10:33 AM), https://www.usnews.com/news/us/articles/
2021-12-24/foreign-college-athletes-left-out-of-rush-for-nil-windfall#:~:text=While%20many
%20college%20athletes%20have,on%20the%20sidelines%20%E2%80%94%20international
%20athletes.&text=By%20Associated%20Press-,Dec.,2021%2C%20at%2010%3A33%20a.m.
[https://perma.cc/CZX2-ZSDR] (“The median for all DI student athletes between July 1 and
Nov. 30 was just $6 per month.”).
234. See id. (“But for those who actually land an NIL deal, the average compensation was
$1,256, or $250 a month.”).
235. See Mitten & Ross, supra note 34, at 855 (asserting that the benefits provided to most
student-athletes under the current system “are likely to be more economically beneficial ...
in the long term than compensating them with cash for their playing services”).
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Moreover, should Congress adopt the suggested conditions for
NCAA antitrust immunity proposed above,236 then any exploitation
of those relatively few athletes who generate substantially more in
revenue than they receive in kind would be reduced in two key
respects. First, by preserving their newfound right to monetize their
NIL, these athletes would be allowed to recoup a potentially
significant portion of their value on the private marketplace.237
Second, by eliminating any age-based draft eligibility restrictions,
the proposed antitrust exemption would allow these athletes to
begin their professional careers as soon as their skills warranted, no
longer subjecting them to one or more years of effectively compulsory service as unpaid college athletes.238
At the same time—but again, more controversially—such a
system would also arguably benefit the public interest insofar as it
would impose a minimal disruption to the current model of “amateur” intercollegiate athletics.239 Therefore, the adoption of an
Olympic model for the U.S. college sports industry along the lines
proposed here would protect the widespread benefits that the
current system provides from disruption post-Alston, while simultaneously decreasing the exploitation of those star athletes harmed
under the existing model.
3. The Limited “Free-Market” Model
Alternatively, should Congress instead prefer to prioritize the
rights of the highest-value athletes, thereby ensuring that each
player is compensated in a manner most directly fitting his or her
ability, then it could instead impose a limited system of free-market
competition on the industry. In this case, Congress would simply
grant the NCAA limited protection to allow it to implement the
basic, competitive-balance-enhancing mechanisms necessary to
help regulate the resulting salary competition among schools.240 As
236. See supra Part IV.B.1.
237. See supra Part IV.B.1.
238. See supra Part IV.B.1.
239. See supra note 164 and accompanying text (discussing recent public opinion polling
showing that few Americans support college athletes receiving salaries from their colleges and
universities).
240. Cf. David A. Grenardo, The Blue Devil’s in the Details: How a Free Market Approach
to Compensating College Athletes Would Work, 46 PEPP. L. REV. 203, 248-49 (2019) (advocating
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discussed above, a completely unregulated system of compensation for the services of college athletes would risk allowing the
wealthiest programs to exert their financial advantages to perpetually secure the services of the most promising athletes, thereby
cementing their dominance on the playing field.241 Because antitrust
law presumably would prevent NCAA schools from unilaterally
agreeing to some form of “salary cap” absent agreement with their
players—and because many schools’ athletes cannot legally unionize
under existing law—some form of limited antitrust exemption would
therefore be necessary to ensure that a free-market system of player
compensation was most closely aligned with the public interest.242
Congress could fashion such relief in any number of ways. For
instance, it could simply immunize any salary restraints that were
approved by a new NCAA governance framework restructured to
include a suitable number of student-athlete representatives, as
advocated for above.243 Alternatively, Congress could attempt to
craft some streamlined rules to ensure that a sufficient share of
revenues go to the players who help generate them. For instance,
drawing upon the general precedent established across the U.S.
professional sports industry, Congress could immunize any agreement by NCAA schools to cap the amount of revenue spent on or
paid to student-athletes at no less than one-half of the total amount
of revenue their team (or their athletic department as a whole) has
generated.244 Or, Congress could—in conjunction with the overall
spending limits advocated above245—establish a regime under which
no NCAA school may spend more on their sports programs than,
say, 150 percent of the median revenues generated by Division I
athletic departments, with at least 50 percent of these expenditures
having to take the form of student-athlete compensation and scholarship support. Each individual school could then decide whether to
allocate this money equally to every athlete on a particular team’s

for a modified free-market system for college athletics).
241. See supra notes 142-45 and accompanying text.
242. See supra Part III.A.
243. See supra notes 207-12 and accompanying text.
244. Similarly, Congress could also consider whether to require schools to maintain their
current levels of scholarship support in addition to any additional cash compensation to
players.
245. See supra notes 218-25 and accompanying text.
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roster, or determine payments based on each individual player’s
talent level.246
Although such a system would unleash considerable change on
the college sports industry, it would also yield several potential
benefits. First, it would ensure that the most talented athletes are
compensated more closely in line with their market value.247 Second,
it could in some ways actually help improve the quality of the
NCAA’s product, incentivizing players who may have otherwise left
school early to pursue a professional salary to stay and complete
their college eligibility.248 At the same time, this reform would also
help to rein in the existing financial advantages that are enjoyed by
a few historically successful programs in each sport.
To be sure, such a systemic change would undoubtedly raise a
variety of additional policy questions for Congress to consider (for
example, what should the tax ramifications of these payments to
student-athletes be,249 and how should Title IX’s gender-equity
provisions apply to this sort of cash compensation?).250 The ideal
resolution of those questions is ultimately beyond the scope of this
Article. Nevertheless, following Alston, it appears that it is only a
matter of time before the judiciary forces the college sports industry
246. Indeed, any rules formulated in this area should ideally be as simplistic and streamlined as possible, in order to both facilitate administrability and engender greater legitimacy.
See Grow & Haugh, supra note 208, at 845-46.
247. See Grenardo, supra note 240, at 248 (crediting such a system with treating athletes
“equitably and like everyone else involved in the multibillion-dollar business of major college
athletics because they will be able to earn compensation in a free market” (first citing Telephone Interview with Jay Bilas, J.D., ESPN Analyst, Of Counsel, Moore & Van Allen (July
24, 2015); then citing Andy Schwarz, But Nobody Even Makes Any Money on College Sports,
SLATE (Jan. 6, 2014, 2:43 PM), https://slate.com/culture/2014/01/paying-college-athletes-apoint-by-point-evisceration-of-the-ridiculous-myths-that-prevent-ncaa-athletes-from-gettingthe-money-they-deserve.html; then citing Andy Fixmer & Curtis Eichelberger, CBS, Turner
Sign $10.8 Billion NCAA Basketball Deal, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 22, 2010, 4:07 PM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2010-04-22/cbs-turner-ncaa-in-14-year-10-8-billionpact-for-basketball-tournament#xj4y7vzkg; and then citing REUTERS, CBS, Turner Sign $8.8
Billion Extension on NCAA Tournament Broadcast, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 10, 2017),
https://www.huffpost.com/entry/cbs-turner-sign-88-billion-extension-on-ncaa-tournamentbroadcast_n_570d6470e4b0836057a2bb8c)).
248. See id. (“[P]layers may stay in school longer and either graduate or get closer to graduating if they sign multi-year deals.” (citing O’Bannon v. NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049, 1059 (9th Cir.
2015))).
249. See Kathryn Kisska-Schulze, Analyzing the Applicability of IRC § 162 on the Pay-forPlay Model, 16 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 190, 190 (2017).
250. See Buzuvis, supra note 163, at 298-99.
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to adopt an unregulated system of free-market competition for the
services of its athletes. Therefore, to the extent that Congress wishes to avoid a further degradation of the industry’s competitive
balance, along with even greater levels of deficit spending and/or the
elimination of a significant number of non-revenue-generating
sports, then some form of intervention along the lines discussed
above would appear to be necessary.
CONCLUSION
Following the events of the summer of 2021, major systemic
change to the U.S. college sports industry appears all but inevitable.
In light of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Alston, it is only a
matter of time until the judiciary forces universities to financially
compete for the services of their student-athletes—unless the NCAA
elects to allow its members to do so voluntarily first. Unfortunately,
barring congressional intervention, such competition will only further exacerbate the industry’s already existing levels of competitive
imbalance and profligate deficit spending, while also making it
harder to achieve meaningful reforms protecting student-athletes’
educational and medical well-being on an industry-wide basis.
Luckily, several options exist for Congress to avoid this outcome,
should it wish to do so. By granting the NCAA and its members a
limited and conditional antitrust exemption, Congress can ensure
that the existing model of intercollegiate athletics is modified in a
manner that will best advance the public interest while still preserving one of the country’s most deeply ingrained and revered
cultural traditions.

